Agulhas
Applied Knowledge

Impact Analysis of LHSP-Implemented Projects through a Perception Study

Lebanon, FY 2021/2022

27 June 2022

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Name of the intervention to which the perception survey relates
Lebanon Host Community Support Programme (LHSP)

Survey time frame and date of the report
2021/2022

Country
Lebanon

Names and organisation of research team
Agulhas Applied Knowledge

Name of the organization commissioning the evaluation
UNDP

Acknowledgements

1.   Executive Summary

In April 2022, Agulhas Applied Knowledge ('Agulhas' or 'we') carried out its third annual perception study into the link between stability and service provision at a municipal level, for the Lebanon Host Security Programme ('LHSP'). Our data collection comprised surveys, one-to-one interviews and focus group discussions ('FGDs'). We summarise our findings below.

- ***2022 data indicated that the effects of the political and economic crisis in Lebanon were becoming more acute and widespread.***

Reports that respondents were no longer able to afford food increased sharply, by c.88% year on year, from 8% in 2021 to 15% in 2022. More respondents reported no longer being able to afford medication or non-essential / leisure items, and respondents reported reduced spending on schooling.

Children and the elderly were described as the most marginalised communities in Lebanon. Individuals engaged in cash-for-work programs, the unemployed and retirees were the three most vulnerable groups, with household incomes below USD 100 per month. Youth and independent workers (freelancers not including day-wage and part-time workers) were most likely to earn higher incomes. Although we found no significant difference between the wages of working women and men, women were much less likely to be engaged in paid employment—over 50% were occupied with housework—which made them more likely to be in the lowest income bracket and, therefore, more vulnerable.

- ***Pessimism about the country's future increased across the board. 85% of the cohort was not optimistic about their future in Lebanon, compared to 70% in 2021. Optimism about respondents' future in their local community also dropped.***

Women were more likely to be pessimistic about their future in the country but less likely to plan to immigrate. Intention to immigrate remained broadly unchanged; it decreased with age and was shaped by attachment to local communities, employment (we found a strong correlation between unemployment and a desire to immigrate), and financial resources.

- ***Respondents believed that public services have deteriorated rapidly, with 81% saying that these have changed for the worse compared with 57% in 2021.***

Residents were most dissatisfied with the state of street lighting, electricity, and roads and bridges. Electricity shortages also affected water provision, which ranked fourth in dissatisfaction rates. Only respondents in Haris and Abbasiyeh reported any meaningful improvements whereas Jdeidet el-Chouf, Baaqline and Qalamoun saw the most significant deteriorations. The few improvements to local services were only reaching Lebanese: no Syrians and no Palestinians reported any improvements to these services. Improvements were also slightly more likely to be observed by women and youth compared to men and those over 50.

- ***Confidence in municipal capability continued to decline across the board, but respondents were split on the causes of the decline. Municipal engagement also decreased by an average of 25% across communities, particularly in Mount Lebanon, which overtook the Bekaa as the least engaged community.***

The perception that the local municipality understood respondents' needs continued to decrease by 20% year on year since we began our survey in 2020. Palestinian, Syrian, youth, the over 50s and women respondents were less likely to report that the municipality understood or could provide for their needs.

Although awareness of local LHSP interventions increased only marginally, public attribution of projects to UNDP increased significantly, from 23% in 2021 to 42% in 2022. This continues a trend of increased awareness of UNDP's involvement in local projects (initially baselined at 12% in 2020). We also found a significant drop in the extent to which UNDP interventions were seen as relevant to the priorities and needs of the community.

Most respondents believed the municipality lacked either the skills or the funds to be effective. Confidence in municipal skills was highest in Mount Lebanon. Syrians were more likely to believe that the municipality had both skills and funds to deliver. But given the pervasive view amongst Syrians that the municipality did not understand the needs of the local community, this findings suggested a level of cynicism towards the municipality: i.e., it could help them, but it chose not to.

Our regression analysis showed that perceived local engagement (through knowledge and / or participation in events) was critical to community members' outlook / optimism about their local community. We found significant positive correlations between participation in municipal events and feeling part of one's own town; feeling part of the town and believing that one could make a difference in their community; and, simply knowing about local events and believing that the municipality was engaging the community.

Finally, we also found a significant positive correlation between the ability to afford food and confidence with local government: the more individuals could afford food, the more confident they were that the municipality was able to provide services based on needs.

- ***As in 2021, respondents in the Bekaa were most likely to report tensions between communities. Except in the South, we found a significant shift since 2021 from Syrian-Lebanese tensions to Lebanese-Lebanese tensions.***

Focus group participants echoed the view that disputes with Syrians had reduced across communities, due to increased sympathy with their plight, as well as greater restrictions on the freedom of movement of Syrians, through curfews, for examples. Respondents continued to report outbreaks of violence with Syrians, however, often triggered by perceptions of Lebanese marginalisation including the perceived uneven distribution of aid. Fights tended to break out in front of banks and supermarkets.

We found increases in respondents who reported turning to their family for help with a dispute, and to the LAF; fewer people said they went to neighbours and friends, or CSOs.

- ***In 2022 children were reported as the most marginalised community; we found indication that absence due to school closures and / or cost of education, truancy, bullying and mental health issues had increased.***

We saw an increase in the percentage of respondents who agreed with the proposition that violence was an acceptable form of discipline in schools, from 2% in 2021 to 5%. Crucially, those who disagreed with that statement reduced by six percentage points, to 90%, even lower than the 2020 rate of 93%.

- ***Perceptions that the Municipal Police (MP) were credible and organised continued to decline, as did trust in their ability to resolve disputes and perceptions that residents felt safe when they saw the police.***

In 2022, we found a 22% decrease in the perceived credibility of municipal police and fewer reports in our interviews that they were able to intervene in any consequential manner. MP credibility reduced most sharply in Mount Lebanon, by 49% to 30%; this was followed by an 18% reduction in the Bekaa to 32% driven by a 42% reduction in credibility in Chtoura.

Trust in the MP's ability to resolve disputes also continued to decrease year on year, to 40% in 2022, and was lowest in the Bekaa, at 22%, likely due to the family / clan-based nature of control in the towns. Although respondents in the South were most likely to perceive the MP as credible, they were least likely to report feeling safe after seeing them. Syrians, conversely, were more likely to feel safe seeing the MP compared to Lebanese.

- ***We found increases in the perception that there was fake news in the media and that fake news had increased community tensions. This included the South where we saw the sharpest year-on-year increase, 78%, in the perception that fake news had increased tensions.***

Mount Lebanon continued to report the highest levels of fake news-induced tensions: 85%, a 14% increase on the previous year, followed by the Bekaa: 79%, which was an 8% increase on 2021. The likelihood of being aware, or part, of a fact-checking campaign increased marginally, within the margin of error, and was driven by a doubling in knowledge of, or participation in, fact-checking campaigns in the South. The data did not indicate whether these changes were due to UNDP's efforts.

2. Recommendations

In view of our research findings, we outline four inter-related strategic recommendations.

Recommendation 1: LHSP should carry out a theory of change workshop to hone its objectives and approach. This should address the increasingly pressing questions related to i) the types of interventions to focus on (be they hard infrastructure, livelihoods, or peacebuilding), and ii) the balance between short-term needs and long-term priorities. Such an exercise would ensure that the intervention is pulling in the same direction across all communities thereby increasing programme coherence and effect.

Issue 1.1: Historically, LHSP's theory of change posited that improving infrastructure and providing cash for work would reduce competition over services and remove a source of tension between Syrians and Lebanese. With tension now sharpest amongst the Lebanese, this theory needs to be interrogated.

Issue 1.2: The LHSP's interventions seem to also be increasingly out of kilter with local needs which focus on electricity, water and livelihoods. With fewer children in schools, we found that the VFS component could be increasingly relevant, though there remain questions about the shape that its interventions should take. The MP and fake news components also needed to be re-thought in the context of the decreased relevance of the MP and increased relevance of fake news.

Recommendation 2: The LHSP should consider the best approach to take in relation to portfolio planning and delivery. This should focus on project relevance and visibility. Through applying more agile techniques (versus 'waterfall' implementation) the LHSP could deliver high-impact projects in shorter timescales and respond to rapidly-changing conditions in Lebanon.

Issue 2: The evidence continues to show that knowledge of projects increases optimism in the community, but we found increased scepticism about the relevance of interventions and the effectiveness of donors given their long planning and implementation timescales. There is a material risk that LHSP project timelines mean that, even if a project was relevant at the point of design, it was no longer relevant to need during implementation. This poses a real risk to value for money as well as the overall stabilisation objectives. If projects are to continue to deliver dividends in terms of community cohesion and trust in municipalities in a rapidly-changing context, then shorter planning cycles and more adaptive delivery are needed to react more quickly to changes in community priorities.

Recommendation 3: To ensure value for money, the LHSP should consider its approach to sustainability, focus on projects that require minimal ongoing maintenance and / or encourage municipalities to come up with creative maintenance plans.

Issue 3: With the municipality no longer able to afford the upkeep of projects—coupled with the increased awareness of the UNDP and donor involvement in project implementation—it is critical for the UNDP to ensure that the quality and legacy of the project is maintained both, to ensure value for money and to reduce the risk of any reputational damage. The LHSP could also consider extending training to MSLDs on development during times of crisis to ensure that there is a demand-side pull for more sustainable delivery.

Recommendation 4: Underpinning all above is a need for the LHSP to reconsider the purpose and ways of working with municipalities.

Issue 4: Given municipalities' deteriorating funding and skills and the differing levels of legitimacy they hold across the country, there is a risk that the municipality's credibility in all areas except the South has taken an irreversible hit. If the UNDP considers that it is worthwhile politically and practically to continue supporting or bolstering these structures, it should consider ways of working with these structures. The LHSP could potentially shift to a mode of protecting existing capacities to have a foundation to build upon as the country emerges from its current crisis.

3. Introduction and methodology

3.1. Research background

In 2020, Agulhas began undertaking annual perception surveys to explore the links between primarily 'hard' (i.e., infrastructure) LHSP projects and the reduction of tensions between Syrian and Lebanese community members. Our research considered a broader range of LHSP projects, including additional UNDP pilot programming to reduce tensions within Lebanese communities and between the Lebanese and displaced Syrians. These pilots addressed 'fake news' campaigns to counter disinformation, violence-free schools ('VFS'), support to municipal police, and a greater focus on community engagement in municipalities (through 'MSR' then 'MSLD' committees).

The table below provides an overview of the indicator data from 2019 to 2022.

Table 1: Indicator data

Indicator	Description	Type	2019	2020	2021	2022
Impact	Proportion of residents in the target municipalities who perceive tensions between refugees and the host communities in the target areas.	Historic	71%	25%	31%	28%
	Proportion of residents who perceive that the municipality is responding to their needs.	Historic	69%	55%	47%	31%
Outcome	% of residents who feel the municipal support projects have a positive impact on the local community.	Historic	57%	72%	61%	55%
	% of residents who are aware of, or participate in, community engagement activities by the municipality.	New	Not applicable ('NA')	39%	40%	27%
	% of residents who believe that the municipality better understands their needs.	New	NA	72%	56%	43%
	% of residents who are aware of, follow, or subscribe to, a local online fake news campaign.	New	NA	22%	25%	25%
	% of residents who believe that fake news can contribute to increasing tensions or incidents.	New	NA	39%	62%	64%
	% of community members who consider that violence in school reinforces cycles of violence in the broader community.	New	NA	87%	81%	88%
	% of residents who believe reducing violence in schools would help decrease tension and violence in the community.	New	NA	80%	84%	87%
	% of residents who feel engaged in the changes that are happening in their community. (MSR)	Historic	27%	37%	25%	20%

3.2. Communities

Our field research took place in the same 10 communities that were baselined in 2020 and then analysed again in 2021, as agreed with the UNDP (see Table 2, below). Three communities were in the Bekaa region, two in the North, three in the South and two in Mount Lebanon.

Two communities, Chekka and Qob Elias, were the target of a broad range of programming, i.e. integrated programmes including traditional LHSP support, counter-disinformation, violence-free schools and municipal policing programming.

Table 2: Research communities

Community	Area	Donor(s)	Intervention Start	Budget (allocated and spent)	MSR	Media	VFS	Municipal police
Qob Elias	Bekaa	LRF-Germany, DFID, Japan	2014	$ 1,185,092	☑	☑		☑
Chtoura	Bekaa	KFW	2020 (under evaluation)	$ 408,500	☑			
Qsarnaba	Bekaa	Italy KFW	2017	$ 251,500	☑			
Qalamoun	North	USA-BPRM KFW	2016	$ 571,944	☑		☑	
Chekka	North	CSSF, DFID	2018	$ 421,022	☑	☑	☑	☑
Miyeh-w-Miyeh	South	DFID	2020 (signed, pending implementation)	$ 261,500[1]	☑			
Haris	South	Italy, DFID	2017	$ 301,535	☑			
Abbasiyeh	South	KFW	2020	$ 781,500	☑			
Jdeidet el-Chouf	Mount Lebanon	Netherlands, CSSF, US-BPRM	2018	$ 998,677	☑	☑	☑	☑
Baaqline	Mount Lebanon	DFID, KFW, LRF-Germany	2015	$ 505,462	☑			

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[1] This excludes the planned extension of the sewage culvert in Haret Saida (budgeted at $259,952), which our records indicated was cancelled.

3.3. Research scope and objectives

We designed our data collection methodology to align with the data required against the indicators outlined in Section 3.1 and the 13 UNDP research components in the project's terms of reference ('ToR'). This structure also guided our KIIs and FGDs. We outline these components in Table 3, below, in the order that addressed in this report.

In Year 3 (2022), the UNDP asked Agulhas to refresh the questionnaire to collect additional data gathering relevant to employment and income levels; to keep the survey balanced in length, the grievance mechanism component was removed and a section on employment inserted in its place. This aimed to add value to the organisation's understanding of the impact of the economic crisis on stability in Lebanon.

Table 3: Sections of the survey questionnaire and their link to the ToR components

Title	ToR Component
Outlook	Changes in perception of residents regarding their agency (including their participation in the identification of needs and priorities) and their sense of optimism for the future.
Quality of services and livelihood opportunities	Changes in residents' assessments of the availability, quality and value of municipal services. Changes in residents' assessments of the availability and quality of livelihood opportunities.
Grievance mechanisms	Residents' awareness of grievance and accountability mechanisms related to the provision of basic services.
Relevance of services	Changes in residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to identify and prioritise needs and capacity to provide, maintain and operate municipal services. Residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to maintain and operate the assets used to provide the municipal services including the assets provided by LHSP.
Community engagement and resident agency	Changes in perception of residents regarding their agency (including their participation in the identification of needs and priorities).
Project-specific questions	Impact of increased municipal services, livelihood opportunities and / or peacebuilding initiatives on residents' confidence in, or perception of the legitimacy of local government, including consideration of attribution. Residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to maintain and operate the assets used to provide the municipal services including the assets provided by LHSP.
Tensions and violence	Changes in the nature and levels of tension, and social stability (e.g. positive interactions, violent incidents, inclusion of different groups – including refugees - in LHSP structures and activities) more broadly, between and among host communities and Syrian refugees.
Integrated approach	Impact of integrated approach (municipal policing, violence free schools and local media support) on social stability in select municipalities. Impact of municipal policing support on residents' sense of community safety and security.
Employment and income	Source and levels of primary and secondary sources of income. Family income ranges and reliance on LBP and USD currency. Affordability of food, medicine and leisure spending.

3.4. Research approach and methods

Our research approach focused on three data collection methods.

- A **quantitative survey** implemented through remote phone-based interviews in each of the 10 communities, which sampled 1,511 respondents. This broadly corresponds to last year's sample size of 1,514.
- **30 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)** supplemented the survey to aid analysis.
- Finally, we ran **10 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)** in May and June 2022 to delve into survey data and aid analysis.

We underpinned our research and analysis with light-touch community-level political economy analysis.

3.5. Sampling

This year, we adopted a mixed methods approach to sampling, using phone-based surveys for 25% of the sample and random in-person sampling for the remaining 75% (i.e. an unbalanced panel). We chose this method to ensure continuity in the respondents, meaning we had a unbalanced panel. In-person surveys also allowed us to reach beyond our existing cohort and draw on a random population subset.

Our sample size was statistically representative, with a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 8. The confidence level allowed us to be 95% certain of the accuracy of the results. The confidence interval reflected the margin of error: if, for example, 48% of the sample selected a certain answer, we could be "sure" that if we had asked the question to the entire relevant population, between 40% (48-8) and 56% (48+8) would have picked that answer.

Our sampling was based on population estimates provided to us by UNDP, shared in 2021. As census data in Lebanon is not public, we were unable to verify these estimates. Where we cite population estimates in subsequent sections, we refer to the source of these estimates if these differ from UNDP estimates.

Table 4: Distribution of respondents by municipality

Area	Village	Total estimated population	Ratio Syrian to Lebanese	Sample size	Lebanese	Syrian
Bekaa	Qob Elias	88,000	2.8:1	170	53	117
Bekaa	Chtoura	2,500	2.6	149	56	89
Bekaa	Qsarnaba	8,000	0.3	145	113	32
North	Qalamoun	10,200	1.6	147	91	56
North	Chekka	8,700	1.2	148	125	24
South	Miyeh-w-Miyeh*	25,000	1.1	160	136	12
South	Haris	8,000	1.1	148	134	14
South	Abbasiyeh	45,000	1.2	149	130	19

Mount Lebanon	Jdeidet el-Chouf	5,924	1.3	150	115	35
Mount Lebanon	Baaqline	22,100	1.1	148	135	13
Total		**223,424**		**1,514**	**1,087**	**411**

* The sample in Miyeh-w-Miyeh included 22 Palestinians.

3.6. Respondent profile

The **demographic profile** of respondents was broadly comparable with 2021. This year, the team interviewed 1,511 individuals, compared with 1,514 in 2021 and 1,407 in 2020. The highest volume of respondents came from the Bekaa and the South due to the higher number of communities sampled in each of these areas: three communities in the Bekaa and the South governorates, compared with two communities in the North and Mount Lebanon governorates.

Table 6, overleaf, disaggregates respondents by age, gender, nationality, education and employment.

Table 5: Distribution of respondents by governorate

Governorate	Number of respondents	Percentage
Bekaa	471	31%
North	296	20%
South	446	30%
Mount Lebanon	298	20%
Total	**1511**	**100%**

In terms of the **gender split**, in 2022 45% of survey respondents identified as female, compared to 55% who identified as male. This is different to previous years when the male to female ratio was more equal (49% and 52% female in 2021 and 2020 respectively).

In previous years, we were able to target our snowball sampling method very clearly and ask specifically for female contacts with whom to speak. This year, with more of the surveying taking place randomly and in person, our access to women depended on the day and the specific community.

Overall, the highest single cohort of respondents in our survey were **youth** (27%) aged between 18 and 29. The only major outlier to this was in Mount Lebanon, where the over 50s dominated in the respondent cohort.

In terms of education levels, respondents in the Bekaa were the least likely to be formally educated or to have only had elementary education. Educational inequality meaning the difference between the number of those to have no, or little formal education, compared to those with postgraduate degrees was most acute in the South.

Overall, we calculated the unemployment rate to be 12%, which was slightly higher than the national average of 11.4% reported by the Central Administration for Statics (CAS) based on the latest household survey data on 2018-2019. Youth unemployment for the age category (18-29) reached 16% in our sample, a result slightly lower than the national youth unemployment rate of 23.3%.[2]

We used the following formula to calculate the unemployment rate.

$$Unemployment\ Rate$$
$$= \frac{Respondents\ who\ are\ not\ working\ and\ looking\ for\ work}{Total\ of\ respondents\ who\ not\ working\ and\ looking\ for\ work, employed, and\ self\ employed}$$
$$Unemployment\ Rate\ = \frac{120}{120 + 350 + 495} = 12\%$$

Across governorates, we recorded the highest unemployed rates in the North at 20%, followed by Mount Lebanon, 15%, the Bekaa, 13%, then the South, 5%.

On the face of it, the data first suggest a significant reduction in unemployment compared to previous years (when, for example, the unemployment rate in the Bekaa was 31%), that said, we continue to see increases in those describing themselves as self-employed (33%) compared to last year (25%) suggesting an increase in irregular employment. Employment rates also increased slightly from 21% in 2021 to 23% in 2022, suggesting that the crisis has forced people into work to generate income that keeps pace with inflation.

Table 6: Respondents distribution by age, gender, nationality, working status, education level across all governorates

Age	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon	Total
18 - 29	31%	38%	21%	17%	27%
30 - 39	31%	22%	28%	20%	26%
40 - 49	21%	18%	24%	20%	22%
50+	17%	22%	25%	42%	25%
Gender	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon	Total
Male	58%	46%	60%	54%	55%
Female	42%	54%	40%	46%	45%
Nationality	Bekaa	North	South	Mount Lebanon	Total
Lebanese	49%	74%	80%	84%	70%
Syrian	51%	26%	15%	16%	28%

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[2] 'Presidency of the Council of Ministers', Central Administration of Statistics, Updated 12 August 2020: http://cas.gov.lb/index.php/component/content/article?id=212

Palestinian			5%		1%
Working status	**Bekaa**	**North**	**South**	**Mount Lebanon**	**Total**
Student	4%	5%	4%	3%	4%
Not working looking for work	8%	13%	4%	10%	8%
Not working not looking for work	4%	4%	6%	7%	5%
Employed	20%	51%	62%	57%	23%
Self-employed	33%	27%	38%	31%	33%
Retired	1%	2%	6%	5%	3%
Occupied with housework	30%	26%	18%	16%	23%
Attained education level	**Bekaa**	**North**	**South**	**Mount Lebanon**	**Total**
No formal education	10%	1%	6%	1%	5%
Elementary	13%	8%	2%	4%	7%
Intermediate	2%	5%	4%		3%
Secondary	34%	19%	21%	18%	24%
University	21%	22%	29%	24%	24%
Postgraduate	18%	18%	22%	18%	19%

As with the previous two years, we saw the lowest levels of formal education among the Bekaa cohort (13%) and those in the highest education levels amongst our respondents in the North (6%). We captured education levels in Figure 1, below.

Figure 1: Respondents' education levels, by governorate

3.7.   Limitations

Three factors limited our survey methodology and analysis.

1. **Elections:** we timed our data collection to avoid the elections, but there is a risk that the pre-election politicking created noise in the data.
2. **Public holidays:** by pulling data collection forward to avoid the election period, our data collection coincided with Easter and Ramadan, making it difficult to reach some participants: this particularly affected our one-to-one interviews.
3. **Focus groups:** these took place in May / June, after elections and were difficult to organise in person due to the cost of petrol / transport and post-election fatigue. We particularly struggled to arrange focus groups in the southern communities of Haris and Miyeh-w-Miyeh.
4. **Survey (and general) fatigue:** we found a high degree of survey fatigue amongst the individuals surveyed; individuals expressed being exasperated / fatalism with current conditions which made them more difficult to engage, compared to previous years.

3.8.   Understanding survey data

Survey respondents all had the option not to answer a question; unless otherwise stated, we excluded most 'no answer' responses to avoid cluttering graphs. For ease of reading, we also rounded up all data to the nearest round number; this means the aggregate number of responses may have occasionally appeared to exceed 100%.

3.9.   Report structure

This report follows the guidelines shared with us in the 2021 UNDP Evaluation Guidelines and walks through our data and analysis and findings through chapters categorised below:

- Context: employability and affordability
- Outlook and optimism in Lebanon
- Quality of services and livelihood opportunities
- Relevance of services
- Community engagement and resident agency
- Project-specific questions
- Tensions and violence
- Taking an integrated approach to programming

Within each chapter we granulate our analysis regionally and per community within the areas that LHSP operate.

All data in sections four to eleven are rounded to the nearest whole number and graphics generally exclude no-answer responses.

4. Employment Context and Affordability

2022 data indicated that the effects of the political and economic crisis in Lebanon were becoming more acute, with the traditional safety nets of family support and remittances being weakened.

15% of respondents described being unable to afford food, compared to 8% in 2021. 23% also reported being unable to afford medicine compared with 18% in 2021. This affected all communities except the North governorate, which had the highest rate of no-change in reported spend compared to other communities in our sample. Our findings from the North should not be generalised onto the rest of the governorate, as our sample was representative at a local level. Individuals were also spending less on schooling and leisure compared to previous years.

Our analysis showed a significant positive correlation between the ability to afford food and confidence with local government: the more individuals could afford food, the more confident they were that the municipality was able to provide services based on needs.

Table 7: Correlation between ability to afford food and confidence in local government

| Affordability of food	Pearson Correlation	0.091**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000

All data in this section are rounded to the nearest whole number and graphics generally exclude no-answer responses.

Figure 2: Affordability across all governorates, rounded to the nearest whole number*

*Note: Those who reported not being able to afford food were not then asked about being able to afford medication, schooling and non-essentials items.

Figure 3: Impact of crisis on food purchases, a three-year timeframe


4.1. Income levels

In 2022, 23% of respondents described themselves as occupied with housework (mainly from the Bekaa and the North), and 21% working independently (mainly from the South and Mount Lebanon). Full-time workers were most likely to hail from Mount Lebanon, followed by the North.

Figure 4: Economic Activity status

In terms of income distribution, 57% of our respondents earned under LBP 3 million per month (equating to 101 USD as per market rate)[3], with the lowest wealth levels in the Bekaa and Mount Lebanon. Communities in the North and South were broadly wealthier; that being said, we found high no-response rates in the South, at 12%, compared to the other governorates.

Figure 5: Family income by wage bracket

We found no significant differences between men and women's wages. Women were slightly more likely than men to be in the lowest income bracket, earning under LBP 1m per month: 9%, compared to 7% of men. This however changed for the LBP 1-3 m bracket, where men on low incomes outnumbered women. Youth were most likely to earn over LBP 7m per month, suggesting perhaps that they have a skillset that the rest of the cohort did not. The over 50s were most likely to earn under LBP 1m, likely due to their reliance on family assistance and, where relevant, pensions. Syrians were most likely to earn between LBP 1-3 million; 53% of our Syrian cohort relied on assistance, and 46% relied on income from work.

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[3] 1 USD = 29,500 LBP as per Jun 15, 2022

Figure 6: Family income by nationality, gender and age

Full-time workers comprised 19% of our respondent pool and part-time workers comprised 17% of our respondents. Part-time workers consisted of day workers receiving cash for work (12%) and part-time employees (5%). 21% of respondents were self employed, which covered both part and full-time work.

The data below showed that independent workers—freelancers not including day workers and part-time workers—were most likely to earn over LBP 3m in earnings. Conversely, respondents engaged in cash for work were most likely to fall in the lowest two income levels (earning under LBP 3m per month) and were amongst the most vulnerable, as were the retired and single-income households (i.e. where one person was occupied with house work).

Table 8: Earnings bracket by working status, all sample*

	Not working; not seeking work	Not working; seeking work	Full time work	Part time work	Indepen-dent	Cash for work	Retired	House work	Total
Under LBP 1m	22%	18%	4%	6%	5%	7%	6%	10%	8%
LBP 1m – 3m	53%	53%	38%	50%	31%	76%	65%	58%	49%
LBP 3m – 5m	8%	12%	31%	24%	28%	12%	15%	19%	22%
LBP 5m – 7m	5%	3%	8%	6%	13%	2%	4%	4%	6%
Over LBP 7m	5%	13%	16%	10%	18%	1%	6%	5%	11%
No answer	7%	3%	3%	4%	5%	3%	4%	4%	5%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Data for 'house work' respondent column referred to their income from all sources (which might be from the primary earner, remittances, pensions or some other source). This data suggests that individuals engaged in house work were more likely to be part of low-income families.

4.2.   Income sources

As discussed in Section 3, the overall unemployment rate across the cohort was 12%. We saw the highest level of unemployment in the North (20%) and the lowest in the South (5%).

Table 9: Unemployment Rate

	Bekaa	**North**	**South**	**Mount Lebanon**	**Total**
Unemployment rate	13%	20%	5%	15%	12%

Across the board, both primary and secondary sources of income came largely from work. Communities in Bekaa and the North relied most heavily on government or NGO assistance: 29% and 21% respectively. Accounting for secondary sources of income showed that 44% of Bekaa respondents relied on international assistance in some form for their income.

Reliance on remittances was higher than the national average at a total of 7%. 5% of respondents relied on such remittances for their primary source of income, and 2% relied on remittances as a secondary source of income.[4]

The data showed that individuals who were not in employment relied heavily on assistance (government or NGO) for a living, suggesting a high rate of vulnerability to variations in external assistance levels.

Table 10: Income source by employment type, all sample

	Not working; not seeking work	Not working; seeking work	Full time work	Part time work	Indepen-dent	Cash for work	Retired	House work	Total
Work income	38%	33%	97%	86%	96%	84%	12%	47%	71%
Remittances	6%	20%	1%	6%	1%		6%	10%	5%
Property rental	3%	5%		1%	1%		2%	2%	1%
Pension	3%	3%	1%	1%	1%	1%	75%	2%	4%
Government or NGO assistance	45%	36%	1%	6%	0%	15%	6%	38%	17%
No answer	6%	4%			1%			1%	1%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Given the higher rates of reliance on government or NGO assistance in the North, it was unsurprising to find that the two sample communities in that governorate had the lowest

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[4] According to the REACH resource centre's Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) data in 21 4.8% of households relied on remittances. See: https://www.reachresourcecentre.info/country/lebanon/cycle/40760/?toip-group=data&toip=dataset-database#cycle-40760

average working hours of our sample. Even though residents in Bekaa were also likely to heavily rely on assistance, they also had the highest average working hours in our sample, likely due to work in very low-wage or seasonal sectors, namely basic construction (in which 23% of the sample worked) and agriculture (also 23%).

Figure 7: Primary source of income

The overwhelming majority of Palestinians were employed in industry, 31%; 15% where professional / technical specialists and 15% were skilled labourers. Palestinians were most likely to be mobile / street workers: 8% compared to 1% Lebanese. Syrians were most likely to be employed in construction, 35%, followed by agriculture and animal husbandry, 26%.

Women were most likely to be being technical specialists (24%), retail staff (19%), or work in administration (16%). Men were most likely to be employed in retail (18%), construction (16%) and agriculture and animal husbandry (10%). Men were more likely than women to be employed in construction (16% compared to 1% women); transport and delivery services (6% compared to no women); skilled labour (9% compared to 1% women). More women than expected worked in agriculture and animal husbandry (7%, compared to 10% men).

Youth were most likely to describe themselves as working in 'other' industries, and we understand from broader research that one subset of youth is working in online services, remotely, supporting clients internationally, for example in marketing and design, mediated through services such as Upwork and Fiverr and charged in USD. This is an area that merits from further future study and might explain why youth and freelancers were most likely to out-earn others at the highest levels. The over 50s were most likely to work in retail (31%) and agriculture and animal husbandry (11%).

Working hours (reported in Figure 8, below) varied slightly by gender and nationality: men were likely to work 44 hours, compared to women who worked an average of 39 hours per

week; Lebanese were also likely to work for 44 hours, compared to an average of 37 for Syrian respondents. We found no material differences by age group.

Figure 8: Average working hours per governorate

*Figure 9: Top 5 types of activity of working respondents*

Figure 10: Type of work by gender, nationality and age.

4.3.   Earnings / currency

Income was mostly being paid in LBP though some individuals, particularly in the North, were also being paid in cash in USD, hence the value in Figure 11 below exceeding 100%. Only 2% of respondents said they received dollars into a "fresh" USD account; such an account would allow them to withdraw the cash and avoid capital controls in place; all individuals who reported receiving fresh dollars lived in the South.

Palestinian respondents and those in Chekka were most likely to receive a USD wage, at 38% and 33% respectively. Lebanese were also much more likely than Syrians to receive a dollar wage. The under-39 cohorts were also more likely to be paid in USD than older age groups. We found no significant differences by gender (see Figure 11).

When asked to report about the salary payments for the primary earner, we found that those Chekka were most likely to receive a dollar wage: 36%, followed by those in Baaqline, 19%, see Figure 12. Primary earners in Chtoura and Jdeidit el-Chouf were least likely to receive a dollar wage (6% each).

Figure 11: Currency of payment – respondent   *Figure 12: Currency of payment – primary earner*

4.4.   Source of unemployment

We asked respondents why they were unemployed and whether they chose to leave work or were made redundant (see Figure 13).

Unemployment was primarily triggered by the business contraction due to the financial crisis, 28%, or business closure due to the financial crisis, 14%. There was some variability in the reasons for job losses across the governorates. The Bekaa region was mostly affected by the crisis, with 64% of job losses being due to the economic contraction. In the North, we saw unemployment to be driven by sole traders deciding to close shop: 32%.

Figure 13: Current work status, unemployed cohort

Women were more likely than men to report that they closed their business due to a personal decision: 18% compared to the 13% men. Men were more likely to report having lost their job due to a contraction or closure triggered by the financial crisis.

Figure 14: Reason for stopping work

In our sample, we found that of the male respondents who self-reported as being unemployed, 59% of them were still looking for work, compared to 31% of women. Syrians were also more likely to be looking for work, 55%, than Lebanese, 44%. The over 50s were also least likely to be looking for work, at 42%, compared to younger cohorts.

Table 11: Reasons for stopping work by gender

	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
The employer closed the business because of Coronavirus	2%	5%	3%
The employer had to close because of the crisis	15%	13%	14%
Let go due to business contraction due to Coronavirus	3%	8%	5%
Let go due to business contraction due to crisis	30%	26%	28%
Personal reasons	21%	20%	20%
Personal decision to close the work	13%	18%	15%
Other	16%	10%	13%
No answer	1%		1%
	100%	100%	100%

4.5. Affordability by governorate

4.5.1. North

Chekka, North Lebanon, is a coastal town proximate to the regional capital, Tripoli, and connected to two other regional centres: Batroun and Jbeil. Qalamoun in the Tripoli area has a mixed urban-rural geography due to its straddling of both the seaside and mountains. Economic activity is concentrated by the seaside.

In terms of food spend, we saw no year-on-year change in the number of those reporting being able to afford food: 3% in total, all of whom came from Chekka. This is a change from the 2021 results, when all respondents who reported being unable to buy food hailed from Qalamoun. We saw slight falls in the numbers of those reporting buying less food, from 74% in 2021 to 68% in 2022.

Across all communities, we found that the North was least affected by medicine shortages, with only 6% of respondents reporting being unable to find medicine in the market. We saw an increase in the number of those who reported being unable to afford medication, from 8% in 2022 to 10% in 2021, an increase driven mostly from Chekka when 11% reported the same in 2022 compared to 4% in 2021.

*Figure 15: Medicine affordability and availability across governorates*

We saw a significant reduction in the number of those who reported being unable to afford schooling, from 45% in 2021 to 7% in 2022, with residents in Qalamoun being more likely to report being unable to afford schooling: 11% compared to 3% in Chekka, or moving children to a cheaper school: 10% compared to 4% in Chekka.

Across our entire sample, Chekka saw the highest rates of those who reported no change to their non-essential spend: 23% compared to an average of 7% in all other communities.

In both, Qalamoun and Chekka, Syrians were much more likely than Lebanese to report being unable to afford food: 19%, compared to 3% Lebanese (all of whom came from Qalamoun). In Qalamoun, all Syrians reported buying less food, compared to 84% of Lebanese. In Chekka, women were less likely to report being unable to afford food: 4.8%, compared to 7.8% of men and more likely to report buying the same amounts of food: 50% compared to 45% of men. This data suggests that the affordability crisis was affecting men more than women.

In both communities, the 50+ cohort was most likely to report buying less food or not being able to afford it entirely. For example, in Chekka, 10% of the over 50s reported not being able to afford food, compared with 5.5% of the remaining cohort. In Qalamoun, 94% reported buying less food compared to 89% of the rest of the cohort.

Figure 16: Spending patterns, North Governorate, rounded to the nearest whole number*

Cannot afford ■ **Buying less** ■ **Buying the same**

(Chart: Spending patterns, North Governorate)

2021:
- FOOD: Cannot afford 3%, Buying less 74%, Buying the same 22%
- MEDICATION: Cannot afford 8%, Buying less 63%, Buying the same 29%
- SCHOOL: Cannot afford 45%, Buying the same 38%
- LEISURE: Cannot afford 51%, Buying less 37%, Buying the same 11%

2022:
- FOOD: Cannot afford 3%, Buying less 68%, Buying the same 29%
- MEDICATION: Cannot afford 10%, Buying less 52%, Buying the same 32%
- SCHOOL: Cannot afford 9%, Buying less 9%, Buying the same 81%
- LEISURE: Cannot afford 47%, Buying less 40%, Buying the same 14%

Note: Those who reported not being able to afford food were not asked about the following questions regarding medication, schooling, and non-essentials. Therefore, the share of respondents for medication, schooling and non-essentials excludes the 17% in 2020 and 8% in 2021 who cannot afford food.

4.5.2. South

On paper, Miyeh-w-Miyeh is a small village east of Saida in southern Lebanon; in reality, its population far exceeds the 4,500 registered residents and its village hosts over 26,000 refugees. Most Palestinian refugees live inside the refugee camp. In comparison, Haris (close to Nabatiyeh) is a village with a relatively homogenous Shi'a population. Our third community, Abbasiyeh, is a larger city in north-east Tyre well-connected to Beirut.

In Haris and Abbasiyeh, we saw significant increases in those who reported being unable to buy food, from 7% and 9% respectively in 2021 to 26% and 18% respectively in 2022. Miyeh-w-Miyeh bucked this trend with fewer individuals reporting being unable to afford food year-on-year: 6% in 2022 from 17% in 2021. Reasons for this are unclear, though this might be due to the community's greater reliance on assistance: all respondents who relied on assistance reported buying less food. Only those who relied on income from work reported being unable to afford food.

In relation to medicine affordability, we saw the same dynamic: more people in Haris and Abbasiyeh reported being unable to afford medicine (21% and 15% respectively compared to 5% and 7% in 2021). In Miyeh-w-Miyeh however, we saw a slight reduction in those who reported the same: 37% in 2022 down from 41% in 2021. In all three communities, we saw an increase in respondents who reported sending children to cheaper schools: 34% in Miyeh-w-Miyeh, 20% in Haris, and 22% in Abbasiyeh (compared with 13%, 7% and 5% respectively in 2021).

Syrians in Haris and Abbasiyeh were much more affected by the crisis than were the Lebanese: 66% of Syrians in Haris, and 38% of Syrians in Abbasiyeh reported being unable to afford food; this compared to 17% and 14% of Lebanese, respectively. As with the North, the cost of living crisis also affected men in Haris and Abbasiyeh more acutely: 32% and 20% of men in the

respective communities said they could not afford food, compared to 18% and 17% of women. In Miyeh-w-Miyeh, 10% of women reported being unable to afford food, slightly above similar reports for men of 9%.

As with the North, older cohorts were less likely to be able to afford food compared to younger ones in both, Miyeh-w-Miyeh and Abbasiyeh. Hairs, however, bucks this trend: 23% of the 18-29 cohort and 42% of the 29-39 cohort reported being unable to afford food, compared to 18% of the 40+.

Figure 17: Spending patterns, South Governorate, rounded to the nearest whole number*

*Note: Those who reported not being able to afford food were not asked about the following questions regarding medication, schooling, and non-essentials. Therefore, the share of respondents for medication, schooling and non-essentials excludes the 30% in 2020 and 11% in 2021 who cannot afford food.

4.5.3. Mount Lebanon

Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline are Lebanese villages in the Chouf District of Mount Lebanon. Both are known for their role in regional trade and are majority Druze. Also known as Bekaata el-Chouf, Jdeidet el-Chouf is ~45 km from Beirut, on the northern bank of the Barouk River. It is known for having one of the largest trade markets in the Chouf district and for its regional famers' markets. Baaqline is larger and more urbanized compared to Jdeidet el-Chouf. This town has been a capital for the ruling families of Mount Lebanon and has a rich historical and cultural heritage.

The effect of the financial crisis on the two sample communities in Mount Lebanon increased significantly. Whereas 10% of respondents last year reported being unable to afford food, 22% of respondents surveyed this year said the same. This reflected an increase in both communities: in Jdeidet el-Chouf, from 20% to 29% in 2022, and in Baaqline, from 1% to 16%. We saw similar increases in those who reported being unable to afford medicine, from 33% in 2021 to 57% in 2022 in Jdeidet el-Chouf and from 49% to 54% in Baaqline. Residents in Mount Lebanon were most likely to report medicine shortages (22%) compared with an average of 10% in the remaining 8 communities. Finally, in Jdeidet el-Chouf we saw a 10-point increase

in those who reported being no longer to afford schooling, to 29% of respondents in 2022. No one in Mount Lebanon reported spending the same on non-essential items.

As in all other communities, we found significant differences in the affordability of food by nationality: 60% and 54% of Syrians in Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline respectively reported being unable to buy food, compared to 20% and 13% of Lebanese respectively. In Jdeidet el-Chouf, women were also much more likely to report being unable to afford food: 42% compared to 18% of men. Conversely, they were slightly less likely to so report in Baaqline: 15% compared to 18% of men.

Figure 18: Spending patterns, Mount Lebanon, rounded to the nearest whole number*

*Note: Those who reported not being able to afford food were not asked about the following questions regarding medication, schooling, and non-essentials. Therefore, the share of respondents for medication, schooling and non-essentials excludes the 30% in 2020 and 11% in 2021 who cannot afford food.

Finally, the over 50 cohort was also less likely to afford food in Jdeidet el-Chouf, 37%, compared to 24% of the rest of the cohort. In Baaqline, the 40-49 age group was least likely to be able to afford food, 23%, followed by youth, 21%, compared to an average of 13% in the other age groups (30-39 and 50+).

4.5.4. Bekaa

Qob Elias, in Zahle, Bekaa, is a town on the Chtoura-Nabatiyeh road. Chtoura is smaller and more affluent and urban area that occupies a more strategic location as core transit route. Qsarnaba is located on a hill: the village's infrastructure is underdeveloped and the area experiences heavy subsidence and mudslides in winter months; the community relies on agriculture.

We saw a significant increase in Bekaa residents who reported being unable to afford food, form 7% in 2021 to 16% in 2022 (the rates of those buying less remained unchanged). Rates were evenly distributed in all three communities. Of those who reported being able to buy food, 20% reported being unable to afford medicine, and 62% were now buying less (compared with 47% in 2021). Respondents in Qsarnaba were most likely to report being

unable to afford medicine (24%). We saw some reduction in residents in Qob Elias who reported the same, from 32% in 2021 to 21% in 2022.

Across all communities, residents in the Bekaa were most likely to report being unable to afford schooling: 46%, compared to an average of 12% in the remaining communities. Chtoura stands out here, with 54% of the town's respondents reporting this, compared with 44% in Qob Elias and 39% in Qsarnaba. 18% of respondents have moved to a cheaper school. Unsurprisingly, Bekaa also saw the highest rates of those who reported no longer being able to afford non-essential spend: 92% in 2022 (up from 75% in 2021), compared with an average of 63% in the remaining communities.

Although Syrians in the Bekaa were less likely to still be able to afford food compared to the Lebanese, we found the sharpest difference in affordability in Qsarnaba. In that community: 24% of Syrians said they could no longer afford food, compared to 13% of Lebanese.[5] In both, Qob Elias and Qsarnaba women were slightly less likely to report being unable to afford food: 13% compared to 19% of men, though in Chtoura, they were slightly more likely to so report: 17% compared to 14% of men. Reasons for these differences are unclear, though the answer to this question relates to affordability at a household level. A future study could explore whether women were more likely to report accurately on affordability, and the extent to which differences in affordability relate to urban-rural dynamics (or any other factors).

Figure 19: Spending patterns, Bekaa, rounded to the nearest whole number*

*Note: Those who reported not being able to afford food were not asked about the following questions regarding medication, schooling, and non-essentials.

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[5] By way of comparison 18% of Syrians in Chtoura and Qob Elias said they could no longer afford food, compared to 14% of Lebanese.

5. Outlook and Optimism

Pessimism about the country's future increased across the board. 85% of the cohort was not optimistic about their future in Lebanon, compared to 70% in 2021. Intention to immigrate remained unchanged, however: when asked 36% of respondents said they planned to leave the country in 2022, compared to 37% in 2021.

Women were as likely as men to be pessimistic about their future in Lebanon, but less likely to plan to leave the country: 39% of women planned to immigrate compared with 45% of men, rates that are broadly unchanged from 2021. Similarly, optimism dropped significantly for both men and women: in 2021, women were more likely to be optimistic about their future in their local community (30%, compared to 23% of men), now they are even less likely to report so being: only 12% of women and 14% of men felt optimistic about their future in their community.

Palestinians were much more likely to report planning to leave Lebanon, 77%, compared with Syrians, 53%, and Lebanese, 29%. 18-39-year olds were also most likely to report planning to leave the country, at 45%, compared to other age groups (which averaged 27%). Over 40s felt most connected to their communities, with 15% of the 40-49 cohort reporting feeling optimistic about the future in their town, and 20% of the over 50s reporting the same.

All data in this section are rounded to the nearest whole number and graphics generally exclude no-answer responses.

Figure 20: Belonging to the country, taking a three-year timeframe[6]

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
[6] In 2020 our survey asked only whether individuals were optimistic and planned to stay, or pessimistic and planned to immigrate. In 2021 and 2022, we did not make an automatic assumption between pessimism and plans to immigrate. Instead, we broke down pessimism into two subsets: pessimism and intention to stay in Lebanon; and, pessimism and plans to immigrate. This made subsequent data more insightful.

According to focus group participants, dissatisfaction in the local state of affairs the desire to immigrate was being mitigated by a reduction in job opportunities globally (particularly in the Gulf), the increased availability of remote jobs, meaning that youth can stay in the country and look after their parents (both reported in Jdeidet el-Chouf), and the concern that individuals would have to "start from scratch" (reported in Qalamoun and communities in the South. According to focus group participants in Baaqline—where rates reflecting intention to immigrate reduced—this was because many who could had already migrated.

5.1. Optimism and immigration

As with last year, optimism is highest in the South, though this has decreased even there from 36% in 2021 to 21% in 2022. Conversely, pessimism was highest in the North (94%) though 86% of pessimists reported having no plans to leave the country, probably due to the expense of immigration. Residents in the Bekaa were most likely to report making plans to immigrate: 59%. This data is slightly skewed by those in Chtoura, 61% of whom reported a desire to immigrate, followed by 49% of those in Qsarnaba.

Residents in Haris and Abbasiyeh were most likely to report feeling optimistic about their future in their community (29% and 30% respectively). Although optimism decreased in all three communities in the South, Miye-w-Miyeh stood out: in that community optimism plummeted from 32% in 2021 to 3% in 2022; this was driven by Palestinians who reported the highest rates of pessimism. Reasons for this are unclear.

Figure 21: Outlook by age, gender, and nationality

In line with broader trends, in the **Bekaa** Syrians were most likely to plan to leave the country (75% in Chtoura, 62% in Qsarnaba and 74% in Qob Elias). Lebanese were also most likely to feel optimistic about their future in the community – especially in Qob Elias, where 16% reported this optimism compared with 8% in Chtoura and 12% in Qsarnaba.

Figure 22: Outlook in Bekaa Governorate

In the Chekka (**North**), all Syrian respondents reported being pessimistic about their future in the country but none of them reported having plans to leave Lebanon. Optimism amongst Lebanese was also limited, at 5% for men and 4% for women. Pessimism amongst Lebanese residents was even more acute in Qalamoun, with only 1% of men and women reporting being optimistic about their future in their town.

Figure 23: Outlook in North Governorate

Data shows that, in the **South**, Syrians are most content and most likely to be optimistic about their future in their community.

In Haris, 28% of Syrians reported such optimism, a level much higher than the 7% reported in 2021, and on par with Lebanese nationals. Men in Haris were more likely to feel optimistic about their future in that community (33%) compared to women (23%). In Abbasiyeh we also found relatively high rate of Syrians who described being optimistic about their future in the town: 17%, though this is a significant fall on 2021 rates of 47%. Optimism amongst Lebanese decreased form 42% in 2021 to 33% in 2022, and women were slightly more likely than men to feel optimistic (31% compared to 29%).

Miyeh-w-Miyeh bucked this trend, however, with only 4% of Lebanese and no Syrians or Palestinians describing optimism about their future in the community. In this community, Syrians were most likely to plan to immigrate (89%), followed by Palestinians (77%). Only 42%

of Lebanese planned the same. Men were also 10 points more likely to plan to immigrate than women (43%).

Figure 24: Outlook in South Governorate

Desire to immigrate was high in **Mount Lebanon:** in Jdeidet el-Chouf, over 21% of Lebanese said they planned to leave the country, and 51% of Syrians said the same - this desire was even across men and women. Lebanese nationals, both men and women, were even more likely to intend to immigrate in Baaqline: 37% said they planned to immigrate and 46% of Syrians said the same.

Figure 25: Outlook in Mt. Lebanon Governorate

5.2. Community belonging

To understand the degree to which respondents felt a sense of belonging to their community, our survey asked whether respondents felt part of their community, and whether they believed they could make a difference in their community.

Across the board, we saw some deterioration in individuals' sense of belonging to their community. Although the rates of those who reported feeling part of their community stayed the same, or in some cases even increased, people are less likely to feel they can make a difference in their town. The sense of alienation from the local community is most acute in Qalamoun, Miyeh-w-Miyeh and Chekka. Qalamoun and Miyeh-w-Miyeh share one feature that might help explain this: they both lack a municipal government

Figure 26: Community Belonging, by governorate

As with last year, a breakdown of data showed that women and young people between 18 and 29 were more likely to feel alienated from their community. Women were also much less likely than men to feel a sense of belonging to their town: 27% said they did not feel part of their town, compared with 19% of men. They were also less likely to feel they could make a difference in their town: 44% of women said they could not make a difference in their town, compared to 33% of men. This result is likely a reflection of women having less of a role in politics and decision making than men.

Youth were less even likely than women to feel part of their town or able to make a difference in it were young people: 32% of 19-29-year olds said they did not feel part of their town, and 40% said they could not make a difference int heir town.

Refugees were most alienated from their community, with 59% of Palestinians and 39% of Syrians saying they did not feel part of their town, and 62% of Syrians and 45% of Palestinians saying they could not make a difference in their community.

*Figure 27: I feel that I am part of this town, by community*

■ Disagree ■ Neutral ■ Agree ■ No answer

Figure 28: I feel that I can make a difference in this town, by community

■ Disagree ■ Neutral ■ Agree ■ No answer

5.2.1. How demographic attributes affected optimism

Our analysis showed a significant correlation between desire to leave the country and the state of employment and age of the respondent. Among Lebanese, we found a strong positive correlation between being unemployed and wanting to leave the country and employment status.

We found an inverse correlation between age and the desire to leave the country: younger people wanted to leave Lebanon. There was no significant correlation between those who wanted to leave the country and education levels. These correlations only applied to Lebanese respondents; we found no such correlations among our Syrian sample. This is likely due to the more complex factors affecting Syrians' presence in Lebanon, and limitations in their ability to emigrate from the country.

Table 12: Correlation between desire to leave Lebanon, age, and employment status

Unemployment	Pearson Correlation	0.155**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000
Age	Pearson Correlation	-0.071**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.006

6. Quality of Services and Livelihood Opportunities

This section explores the changes in residents' overall perception in the state of service (such as water, sewerage and road quality), and the availability of job or livelihood opportunities.

Changes in residents' assessments of the availability and quality of livelihood opportunities.	Changes in residents' assessments of the availability, quality and value of municipal services.

6.1. Livelihood opportunities

In all communities excepting Mount Lebanon, respondents described finding fewer job opportunities in 2022 compared to a year ago. A total of 83% described there being fewer job opportunities (up two points from 2021) and only 2% described seeing more opportunities, down from 4% in 2021.

Figure 29: Perceived year-on-year change in job opportunities, by region

All three nationalities surveyed (Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian) described seeing fewer jobs, but refugee communities were clearly affected more acutely by job shortages: 100% of Palestinians and 87% of Syrians sampled saw fewer job opportunities, compared to 81% of Lebanese. Women were slightly less likely to feel there were fewer jobs in their community, with 3% reporting seeing more jobs, compared to 2% men, and 78% reporting fewer jobs compared to 87% of men. This might reflect the fact that women in our cohort were less likely to be part of the labour force (50% of our female sample was engaged in housework) and therefore less likely to be aware of job opportunities and be affected by these.

7% of respondents in the South described there being more job opportunities. A closer reading of the data shows that most, 13%, hailed from Abbasiyeh and 6% from Haris. Abbasiyeh and Haris were also least likely to describe there being fewer local jobs: 59% and 66% respectively. Qalamoun, Qob Elias, Miyeh-w-Miyeh and Chtoura were most affected by the contraction: 96% of Qalamoun and Qob Elias respondents, 95% of those in Miyeh-w-Miyeh and 91% of

Chtoura respondents reported finding fewer job opportunities, compared to an average of 75% in the remaining six communities.

The 30-39 age group were most likely to be aware of more jobs in the community, but the 18-29 age group were least likely to report seeing fewer jobs around: 79% compared to an average of 84% in the remaining age groups, instead they were more likely to see no year-on-year change.

In the Bekaa, all of those who reported an increase in job availability attributed this to private sector investment, as did most of those in the South (68%) and many in Mount Lebanon (25%). In the South, residents also attributed increased job availability to the reduced competition with Syrians (10%) and to local municipal efforts (6%). In focus group discussions, respondents in Abbasiyeh also attributed an increase in employment due to the relatively high presence of government institutions and the fact that many locals had left the town, which created new vacancies across the local economy.

Private sector investment seemed concentrated in Chtoura (100%), Haris (89%) and Abbasiyeh (65%), and affected Syrians slightly more than Lebanese. 80% of Syrians who perceived an increase in jobs attributed this to private sector investment, compared with 61% of Lebanese. Again, women were more likely to attribute the increase in jobs to private sector investment (70%, compared with 56% men). The attribution of more jobs to donor support fell off the list entirely. In 2021 38% of those who saw an increase in jobs attributed this to donor support, compared to none in 2022.

Figure 30: Perceived year-on-year change in job opportunities, by community

Respondents were most likely to attribute the reduction in jobs to the country's economic situation. This was specifically the case in the North and Mount Lebanon where 98% and 95% of respondents respectively drew that link. Respondents in the Bekaa and the South also largely agreed (89% and 73%) respectively, but they were also the most likely cohorts to attribute the job contraction to a lack of international support: 4% in the South and 3% in the Bekaa. This is likely due to the community's demographic and the narrative often espoused by the Shi'a political leadership to the effect that the international community was largely

responsible for the country's financial woes and was seeking to punish Lebanon due to the presence of Hisb'allah.

Communities were only marginally likely to believe that competition with Syrians affected job availability, 3%, and only 2% attributed this to lack of municipal effort and limited private sector investment. In terms of community-related outliers, residents in Haris, Abbasiyeh and Chtoura were most likely to attribute lack of job availability to competition with Syrians: 8%, 6% and 5% respectively. Residents in Miyeh-w-Miyeh were also more likely to blame a lack of private sector investments: 11%, followed by those in Abbasiyeh: 6%. Residents in Qob Elias and Abbasiyeh and Chtoura were also more likely than other communities to blame the municipal government: 6%, 5% and 5% respectively.

In terms of a demographic breakdown, Palestinians were more likely to believe that competition with Syrians affected opportunities than were the Lebanese: 5% responded that this was the reason behind the reduction in jobs, compared to 3% of Lebanese. This suggests a greater competition (probably for low-paid jobs) between the two refugee communities. Syrians were also slightly more likely to blame international donors (3%) than were Lebanese (2%). We found no other significant differences by gender or age, except that the older respondents were, the more likely they were to blame international donors for the reduction in jobs (4% of the 40+ cohort, compared to 1% of 18-29-year olds).

6.2.   Quality of Services

The reported state of services deteriorated radically, with 81% of respondents saying that these change for the worst compared with 57% in 2021 and 54% in 2020. Only 3% of respondents reported seeing an improvement in service quality compared to 9% in 2021 and 11% in 2020.

According to the data, improvements in local services were only reaching Lebanese: 4% of Lebanese reported an improvement, compared to no Syrians and no Palestinians. These improvements were slightly more likely to reach women: 4% compared to 3% of men, and were twice more likely to be perceived by youth: 4%, compared to 2% of the over 50s.

Figure 31: year-on-year change in services' quality

Palestinians, 95%, were more likely than Syrians, 82%, and Lebanese, 81%, to report a deterioration in services. Older cohorts were also more likely to report such a deterioration compared to younger age groups: 87% of the over 50s compared with 77% 18 to 29-year olds. Men were also more likely to so report (83%) compared to women (78%). This data

suggest that older respondents and Palestinians were more acutely affected by reduced service provision.

On a community level, residents were most likely to report a deterioration in services in Jdeidet el-Chouf (97%), Baaqline (92%) and Qalamoun (95%). Only respondents in Haris and Abbasiyeh reported any meaningful improvements in the state of local services: 15% in Haris and 14% in Abbasiyeh.[7]

*Figure 32: Change in overall quality of services compared to a year ago, by region*

Of the small number of respondents—40—who reported an improvement in services, most (89%) attributed this to municipal efforts and 9% attributed this to donor support. All reports of improvements in Haris and Baaqline were attributed to municipal effort, and 76% of reports in Abbasiyeh were so attributed. Abbasiyeh were also likely to attribute this to support from international donors, 19%.

Syrians were more likely than Lebanese to attribute improvements to municipal efforts: 100% compared to 89% of Lebanese, although their numbers were fewer in our sample. Only Lebanese community members attributed improvements to donor support; this suggests that support may not be reaching refugee communities. No one attributed improvements to central government efforts.

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[7] The only other community to report an improvement in local services was Baaqline, where 1% of respondents so reported.

Figure 33: State of services, by demographic attributes

6.3. North

In 2022, respondents in North governorate were least likely to be satisfied with electricity, street lighting and youth activities. The low satisfaction with youth activities is broadly consistent with the levels seen in 2021, and youth activities and street lighting came up in all three years.

Table 13: The three services that respondents are most dissatisfied with, North Governorate

Service 2020	% Dissatisfied 2020	Service 2021	% Dissatisfied 2021	Service 2022	% Dissatisfied 2022
Street lighting	38%	Street lighting	66%	Electricity	96%
Youth activities	36%	Youth activities	62%	Street lighting	91%
Roads and bridges	35%	Roads and bridges	57%	Youth activities	62%

North Governorate residents were most likely to be satisfied with the state of local markets, school buildings and healthcare services. We saw significant year-on-year deteriorates in the quality of roads and bridges (from 37% satisfied in 2021 to 19% satisfied in 2022) and street lighting (from 28% satisfied in 2021 to 4% satisfied in 2022).

Qalamoun appears to be more acutely affected by poor service quality. We saw significant differences in satisfaction / dissatisfaction between Chekka and Qalamoun in relation to:

- Healthcare: 58% dissatisfied in Chekka, compared to 14% in Qalamoun
- Agricultural roads: 84% dissatisfied in Qalamoun versus 7% in Chekka
- Youth services: 87% dissatisfied in Qalamoun compared with 37% in Chekka
- Roads and bridges: 93% dissatisfied in Qalamoun compared with 60% in Chekka
- Waste collection: 73% dissatisfied in Qalamoun compared with 10% in Chekka
- Sewage: 77% dissatisfied in Qalamoun compared with 17% in Chekka
- Water: 67% dissatisfied in Qalamoun compared with 18% in Chekka.

According to focus group discussions, although satisfaction with water in Chekka was high, participants stated that this service had significantly deteriorated in quality in the past month; although one participant reported that the water issue had been fixed, the perception is that it is still inadequate. Participants also said that street lighting was non-existent which made locals fearful of going out at night.

In Qalamoun, participants disagreed with satisfaction rates with school buildings, local markets and healthcare services, stating that these had not improved at all; that the municipality had stopped working and that it failed to listen to local concerns. Roads were reported to be particularly problematic in that community, affecting travel to a local school and markets. Residents also stated that water services were insufficient and that the summer months will add yet more pressure on supply. They said that two local wells could be used for water supply, but they needed fixing, which the municipality has not done.

Figure 34: Satisfaction with services, North Governorate

6.3.1. Whether LHSP projects address local needs and priorities

The table below cross-references the services that community members found least satisfactory with projects known to have been implemented by the LHSP. This analysis takes low satisfaction rates to be a proxy for priority services; where needs and LHSP programmes do not overlap, there may be space for future UNDP interventions.

According to this analysis, in North Lebanon the LHSP has implemented programmes none of the three areas described as being most acutely problematic; this shows a continued reduction in the relevance of UNDP projects on previous years: in 2021 the UNDP programmed in two

relevant areas; and in 2020 the UNDP funded projects in four of the six areas identified as local priorities. Key gaps are in programmes to improve street lighting in Qalamoun and Chekka, and improvements to roads and bridges and agricultural infrastructure in Chekka.

Table 14: LHSP projects in the North and services that residents are most dissatisfied with

Town	LHSP projects	Status	Service	Reported satisfaction with services	Least satisfied with…
Qalamoun	Rehabilitation of Qalamoun public school for boys	completed	School buildings	65%	
	Provision of a water truck to Qalamoun	completed	Water	32%	
	No LHSP activities				Electricity (3% satisfied)
	No LHSP activities				Roads and Bridges (3%)
	No LHSP activities				Street lighting (4%)
Chekka	Improve the solid waste management in the village and activate the sorting from source process (procurement and capacity building)	completed	Waste collection	90%	
	Support SWM sector (phase 2)	ongoing	Waste collection	As above	
	No known LHSP activities				Street lighting (3% satisfied)
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (5% satisfied)
	No known LHSP activities				Roads and bridges (34% satisfied)

6.4.   Bekaa

In 2022, Bekaa residents were least likely to be satisfied with the state of electricity, street lighting and agricultural roads. We saw dissatisfaction in street lighting in 2021, though this has become more acute in 2022 (going from 60% dissatisfied to 83% dissatisfied).

Table 15: The three services that respondents are most dissatisfied with, Bekaa Governorate

Service 2020	% Dissatisfied 2020	Service 2021	% Dissatisfied 2021	Service 2022	% Dissatisfied 2022
Youth activities	52%	Youth activities	66%	Electricity	94%
Roads and bridges	52%	Street lighting	60%	Street lighting	83%
Water	41%	Roads and bridges	58%	Agricultural roads	66%

Residents in the Bekaa were most likely to be satisfied with waste collection, followed by the quality of local markets and sewage drainage. We found dissatisfaction levels to be much higher in Qsarnaba than in the other two communities:

- Qsarnaba residents were more likely to be dissatisfied with the state of roads and bridges (94%) compared with those in Qob Elias (78%) and Chtoura (70%)
- Qsarnaba residents were more likely to be dissatisfied with the quality of street lighting (94%) compared with those in Chtoura (71%)
- Qsarnaba residents were more likely to be dissatisfied with the quality of school buildings (40%) compared with those in Qob Elias (17%) and Chtoura (14%)
- Qsarnaba residents were more likely to be dissatisfied with the quality of youth activities (65%) compared to those in Qob Elias (39%)
- Qsarnaba residents were more likely to be dissatisfied with healthcare services (50%) compared to those in Qob Elias (38%) and Chtoura (32%).

Chtoura residents were more likely to be dissatisfied with water services (69%) than those in Qsarnaba (50%). Qob Elias residents were more likely to be dissatisfied with sewage services (41%) compared with Chtoura and Qsarnaba (both 29%).

In Chtoura, focus group participants reported that improvements to water supply were being stymied by electricity shortages which meant that the area could not operate the water pump. All participants agreed that road maintenance was lacking, in line with our survey results; this was a major problem as Chtoura was a major transit point in the Bekaa.

In Qob Elias, participants said that contrary to the survey's findings, water services had improved since last year, mainly because of an international organisation's efforts in the past year. The quality of street lighting was reported to be the worst, and was deteriorating further. Conversely, in Qsarnaba participants largely agreed with survey findings and blamed the deterioration in services in the municipality's failure to collect fees and taxes, which affected budgets.

Figure 35: Satisfaction with services, Bekaa Governorate

The table below cross-references the services that community members found least satisfactory with projects known to have been implemented by the LHSP. This analysis takes low satisfaction rates to be a proxy for priority services; where needs and LHSP programmes do not overlap, there may be space for future UNDP interventions.

According to this analysis, the LHSP has planned or implemented programmes in none of the priority areas highlighted in the Bekaa, down from three in 2022.

Table 16: LHSP project and services that residents are most dissatisfied with

Town	LHSP projects	Status	Service	Reported satisfaction with the services	Least satisfied with...
Qob Elias	Improve the wastewater treatment facility	completed	Sewerage	52%	
	Design and construction of 11 Km irrigation canals network	completed	Agricultural infrastructure	35%	
	Construction of a sports complex and a fence to the basketball court	completed	Youth Activities	31%	
	Rehabilitation and equipment of the Lebanese Red Cross and SDC healthcare centres	Evaluation completed	Healthcare	56%	
	No known LHSP activities				Street lighting (13%)
	No known LHSP activities				Roads and bridges (17%)
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (7% satisfied)
Chtoura	Construction of a storm water network	Under evaluation	Sewerage	70%	
	No known LHSP activities				Roads and bridges (21%)
	No known LHSP activities				Street lighting (25%)
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (5%)
Qsarnaba	*Rehabilitation of Agricultural Roads in Qsarnaba*	Under procurement	Agricultural infrastructure	9%	
	No known LHSP activities				Roads and bridges (4%)
	No known LHSP activities				Street lighting (4%)
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (2%)

6.5. South

Across all three years of our research dissatisfaction with water services remained consistently high in the South. Apart from water, we found that residents in the South were also highly dissatisfied with water (91%) and street lighting (54%). Beyond this, we found higher levels of satisfaction overall than in other governorates. Residents in the South were most likely to be satisfied with waste collection, school buildings and transport infrastructure (roads and bridges).

Table 17: The three services that respondents are most dissatisfied with, South Governorate

Service 2020	% Dissatisfied 2020	Service 2021	% Dissatisfied 2021	Service 2022	% Dissatisfied 2022
Water	50%	Sewerage	35%	Electricity	91%
Youth activities	40%	Water	29%	Street lighting	54%
Healthcare services	35%	Roads and bridges / street lighting	23%	Water	40%

We found much higher levels of dissatisfaction with local services in Miyeh-w-Miyeh compared to our other two communities in the South particularly in relation to the more critical infrastructure, such as water, sewage and roads and bridges. In that community, more men were dissatisfied in general, 45% than were women: 33%.

In the South on the whole men were more likely to be dissatisfied with local services than were women. Where women were comparatively more dissatisfied, they were more likely to be dissatisfied with waste collection, the state of local markets and, in Abbasiyeh, the quality of school buildings.

Table 13: Comparing dissatisfaction with services, South

	Miyeh-w-Miyeh	Haris	Abbasiyeh
Water	70%	19%	33%
Sewage	41%	7%	12%
Waste collection	32%	6%	6%
Roads and bridges	46%	1%	13%
Street lighting	54%	62%	47%
School buildings	32%	5%	5%
Youth activities	42%	11%	11%
Healthcare services	37%	5%	10%
Local markets	36%	1%	7%
Agricultural roads and irrigation canals	10%	6%	9%

In Miyeh-w-Miyeh focus group participants reported that water services ranged from poor to very poor depending on the neighbourhood and because the water network—in place since

the French mandate—had apparently not seen major upgrades and did not accommodate the increased population levels of presence of refugee camps. Participants stressed that roads and local infrastructure had deteriorated significantly and said the municipality was not intervening. Although they were aware of an NGO's efforts to initiate a bin sorting programme, this was then abandoned and the project failed; they also criticised efforts to improve road lighting as unsustainable so long as the electricity could not reach public networks.

Focus group participants in Haris said that the community had a high number of wealthy residents willing to help the community which spared them many of the difficulties faced in other towns. Although they said that fuel shortages had affected water supplies (because pumps could not be operated at full capacity), where residents did not have access to wells, the municipality provided a regular water truck at no extra cost.

Figure 36: Satisfaction with services, South Governorate

Finally, in Abbasiyeh focus group participants reported that water and sewage networks improved year on year due to a solar energy project dedicated to water pumps; although the benefits of this project had yet to reach the entire community, this had improved satisfaction with these services. In that community, the energy crisis remained the primary concern, but participants did not blame the municipality for this. Finally, they also agreed that youth services / activities had improved, mostly due to international organisations rather than the municipality itself.

The table below cross-references the services that community members found least satisfactory with projects known to have been implemented by the LHSP. This analysis takes

low satisfaction rates to be a proxy for priority services; where needs and LHSP programmes do not overlap, there may be space for future UNDP interventions.

In 2022, the LHSP has planned or implemented programmes in only one of the priority areas in the South; this is a significant reduction year-on-year from 2021 when the LHSP implemented programmes in four of the six relevant areas.

Table 18: LHSP projects in the South and services that residents are most dissatisfied with

Town	LHSP projects	Status	Service	Reported Satisfaction with services	Least satisfied with…
#Miyeh-w-Miyeh	Extension of the sewerage culvert in Haret Saida	cancelled	Sewerage	34%	
	Provision and installation of LED Lights	contract signed, implementation will start soon	Street lighting	19%	Street lighting
	No known LHSP activities				Water (12%)
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (3%)
Haris	Support to cooperatives	completed	Livelihoods		
	Establishing and equipping multi-purpose facility	under contract signature	Unclear		
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (2%)
	No known LHSP activities				Street lighting (23%)
	No known LHSP activities				Healthcare (42%)
Abbasiyeh	Rehabilitation of medical solid waste management facility and provision of equipment	Ongoing	Waste collection	84%	
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (1%)
	No known LHSP activities				Street lighting (47%)
	No known LHSP activities				Water (50%)

6.6. Mount Lebanon

Residents in Mount Lebanon reported being most dissatisfied with electricity, street lighting and local markets. Dissatisfaction with local markets has been consistent in Mount Lebanon for the past three years, and has increased year on year, from 45% in 2020 to 82% in 2022. That aside, all respondents in that governorate were dissatisfied with electricity, and 94% were dissatisfied with street lighting.

Table 19: The three services that respondents are most dissatisfied with, Mount Lebanon

Service 2020	% Dissatisfied 2020	Service 2021	% Dissatisfied 2021	Service 2022	% Dissatisfied 2022
Youth activities	57%	Roads and bridges	70%	Electricity	100%
Roads and bridges	53%	Local markets	58%	Street lighting	94%
Local markets	45%	Street lighting	58%	Local markets	82%

Residents were most likely to be satisfied with waste collection and healthcare services (both of which had 32% satisfaction rates) and school buildings (25%). Overall satisfaction rates were, however, low, at 16% on average.

We found dissatisfaction with services to be much more acute in Jdeidet el-Chouf. Residents there were more likely to be dissatisfied with:

- Local markets (99%), compared to those in Baaqline (65%)
- Healthcare services (59%) compared to those in Baaqline (38%)
- Youth activities (82%) compared to those in Baaqline (69%)
- School buildings (37%) compared to those in Baaqline (22%)
- Street lighting (100%) compared to those in Baaqline (87%)
- Roads and bridges (85%) compared to those in Baaqline (79%)
- Waste collection services (46%) compared to those in Baaqline (35%)
- Water services (60%) compared to those in Baaqline (37%)

Residents in Baaqline were only more likely to be dissatisfied with agricultural roads (76%) compared with those in Jdeidet el-Chouf (22%).

In Baaqline focus group participants broadly agreed with survey findings showing that locals were most dissatisfied with street lighting. The absence of street lighting made people afraid to go out after dark. They broadly agreed that the state of waste collection was acceptable, though said there were variations in whether individuals were recycling, and why. Water services were also described as acceptable, although participants said this varied depending on the season and there were shortages in the summer months. Dissatisfaction with markets seemed to be driven by the increase in the price of goods in the market; participants stated that the same items could be were cheaper outside Baaqline. Finally, residents reported that there were no places for youth to socialise, such as parks or walks; they argued that there

should be such spaces, and that these spaces could make provision for older people to get together to play cards and drink coffee.

In Jdeidet el-Chouf, participants were mainly dissatisfied with sewage: although there was a functioning sewage pump, this sometimes broke or malfunctioned and the municipality lacked the means to fix it. Waste collection as also problematic as the City Blue agency often went on strike and did not pick up trash. Although people were dissatisfied with youth activities, one participant stated that the MSLD committee had tried to instigate events and activities but individuals did not participate.

Figure 37: Satisfaction with services, Mount Lebanon Governorate

The table below cross-references the services that community members found least satisfactory with projects known to have been implemented by the LHSP. This analysis takes low satisfaction rates to be a proxy for priority services; where needs and LHSP programmes do not overlap, there may be space for future UNDP interventions.

In 2022 the LHSP designed and implemented interventions in none of the priority areas identified in Mount Lebanon. This is a reduction on the previous year when the LHSP implemented programmes in all three priority areas identified in Baaqline, and two of three priority areas identified in Jdeidet el-Chouf.

Table 20: LHSP projects in Mount Lebanon and services that residents are most dissatisfied with

Town	LHSP projects	Status	Service	Reported Satisfaction with services	Least satisfied with…
Baaqline	Support the sorting from the source through the provision of waste management equipment	ongoing	Waste collection	45%	
	Construction of rainwater canals in El Arabis area	ongoing	Sewerage	31%	
	Rehabilitation of storm water canals	completed	Sewerage		
	Setting up the medical room of Baaqline Public (Interim) School	completed	Healthcare	41%	
	Supporting the services of Baaqline House Center Association Primary Health Care Center	completed	Healthcare		
	Supporting the services of Baaqline Social Development Center	completed	Healthcare		
	Equipment of the National Library	completed	Youth Activities	10%	
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (0%)
	No known LHSP activities				Street lighting (6%)
	No known LHSP activities				Roads and bridges (7%)
Jdeidet el-Chouf	The rehabilitation of Jdeidet el-Chouf Market sidewalks	On-going	Local markets	51%	
	Rehabilitation of Jdeidet Al Chouf Market sidewalks	completed	Local markets		
	Construction of a multipurpose sport playground	completed	Youth Activities	2%	
	Construction of storm water drainage channels	ongoing	Sewerage	14%	
	No known LHSP activities				Streetlighting (0%)
	No known LHSP activities				Electricity (0%)
	No known LHSP activities				Roads and bridges (3%)

7. Relevance of Services

Changes in residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to identify and prioritise needs, and to provide, maintain and operate municipal services.

7.1. Overall findings

The volume of respondents who agreed that their local municipality understood their needs continued to decrease, from 56% in 2021 to 43% in 2022. This continued the c.20% year-on-year reduction in the number of respondents who agreed that the municipality understood their needs from 2021.

The drop was sharper in the number of those who reported that the municipality could provide services to cater to these needs, from 11% year on year between 2020 and 2021, to 34% between 2021 and 2022.

Palestinian and Syrian respondents were less likely to report that the municipality understood or could provide for their needs, although the reported difference in the municipality's understanding of endogenous and exogenous groups' needs greater than the gap in its ability to provide to these needs for these groups. Women were slightly less likely than men to believe that the municipality understood or provided for local priorities, though the difference was slight and therefore within the margin of error. Youth and the over 50s were more likely to disagree that with the statement that the municipality understood their needs, and that it was able to provide services accordingly.

Figure 38: municipal understanding of, and capability to deliver against local priorities and needs, by demographic attributes, 2022

Finally, in 2022 respondents were more likely to report that the municipality had neither the skills nor the funds to provide local services; this increased from 14% in in 2020, to 23% in

2021 and 40% in 2022, an increase of over 60% year on year. Palestinians and youth in the 19-29 cohort were much more likely to report that the municipality lacked both, the skills and funds; conversely, Lebanese men over 50 were most likely to blame the shortage in funding rather than skills.

Figure 39: Perception of municipal competence and funding, by demographic attributes

7.2.   Community-Level Analysis

In 2022 community members in **Mount Lebanon** and the **South** were most likely to agree that the municipality understood their needs and priorities. This is a change on the 2021 rates when the perception of municipal understanding was within a small range across all communities: in that year the variability in perceived understanding across communities was between 55% (Bekaa) and 58% (North).

We found the highest confidence in municipal understanding in Jdeidet el-Chouf, 76%, and Haris, 66%. We found the lowest confidence levels in Qalamoun, 10%, and Chtoura, 20%.

With regards to service provision, residents in Haris, 69%, and Abbasiyeh, 57%, were most likely to report that the municipality met local needs. We found large drops (of over 50%) in confidence in Chtoura, Qarnaba, Qalamoun and Chekka. Confidence in the Municipality's ability to meet local need remained broadly unchained year-on-year in Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline. That said, this year in Jdeidet el-Chouf many more citizens were willing to disagree with the statement that the municipality was able to meet needs, 82% compared to last year, 57%.

Figure 40: Municipal understanding and capability, by governorate.

As previously discussed, in 2022 confidence in municipal competence decreased across the board: in 2021 a total of 37% believed that the municipality lacked skills or skills and funds, compared to 53% in 2022. Confidence in municipal capability was weakest in Mount Lebanon, where 72% of respondents believed that the municipality lacked skills.

Perhaps surprisingly, 22% of 2022 respondents believed that the municipality had both the skills and the funds; although this is a 10-point decrease on 32% in 2021, this was higher than expected given the broader economic context. Respondents in the **South** were most likely to believe that the municipality had both the skills and funds to deliver (at 44%), followed by the North and Bekaa (17% each).

On a community level, confidence was highest in Miyeh-w-Miyeh (50%), followed by Haris (47%) and Abbasiyeh (34%). Confidence levels in Chekka also remained high relative to the rest of the cohort, at 30%, compared with a paltry average of 3% across all the remaining communities.

Figure 41: Perception of municipal competence and funding, by governorate

7.3.   North

In both communities in the North, Lebanese were more likely than Syrian to believe that the municipality understood local priorities. In Qalamoun rates stood at 90% of Lebanese and 84% of Syrians in Chekka, they were much lower at 38% of Lebanese compared with 32% of Syrians.

In Qalamoun, we found no significant differences by gender in perceptions of the municipality's understanding and ability to meet local priorities. More men than women in Qalamoun—14% to 5%—believed that the municipality understood priorities. More men than women—10% to 0%—also believed believe the municipality was able to provide services.

In Chekka, FGD participants stated that the municipality did not try to identify priorities, but it listened to concerns raised to it and tried to help. In Qalamoun, participants said that the new municipality was not at all concerned with people's needs; they cited examples such as the lack of provision of electricity on the streets during Ramadan, a refusal to help acquire fuel for a generator that staff had donated to a local school and the fact that the local school did not have access to water (the municipality was aware of this issue), which meant that staff and students sometimes had to return home during the day simply to use the toilet.

Figure 42: Municipality's understanding of needs and provision of services based on this

In Chekka, Lebanese residents were much more likely to be critical of the governorate and say that the lack of service delivery was due to a shortage of skills (35%) or skills and funds (24%). Conversely, Syrians were much more likely to state the municipality had both, the skills and funds (42%) or attribute poor service delivery to a shortage in funding rather than a dearth of skills (24%). Women (36%) were also more likely than men (23%) to attribute poor service delivery to a shortage in skills rather than funds.

Figure 43: Perception of municipality's skill level and availability of funds to provide services; North

Legend: ■ Both skills and funds ■ Skills but not funds ■ Funds but not skills ■ Neither

2021
- QALAMOUN: 14% / 7% / 16% / 61%
- CHEKKA: 71% / 4% / 12% / 9%

2022
- QALAMOUN: 5% / 1% / 91%
- CHEKKA: 30% / 30% / 14% / 22%

7.4. South

In the South across the board we found that Lebanese were much more likely than Syrians to believe the municipal authorities understood their needs and / or provided relevant services. In Haris, 71% of Lebanese believed the municipality understood priorities, compared to 45% of Syrians, and 72% of Lebanese respondents said the municipality delivered, compared to 72% of Syrians. In Abbasiyeh, 61% of Lebanese believed the municipality understood priorities, compared to 31% of Syrians, and 61% of Lebanese respondents said the municipality delivered, compared to 41% of Syrians. Finally, in Miyeh-w-Miyeh, 30% of Lebanese believed the municipality understood priorities, compared to 11% of Syrians, and 23% of Lebanese respondents said the municipality delivered, compared to 11% of Syrians.

We found no significant differences by gender in local municipalities' perceived ability to understand priorities and cater to them. In Miyeh-w-Miyeh more men, 30%, compared to women, 21%, were likely to believe males the municipality understood priorities; in Haris 71% of men agreed this was so, compared to 45% of women, and in Abbasiyeh, 64% of men believed the municipality understood priorities, compared to 45% of women. This data suggests that women felt much less engaged and understood by the municipality than did men.

In Abbasiyeh, FGD participants appreciated that the municipality tried to alleviate the impact of the crisis through providing food baskets during Ramadan. They said that the common perception of the municipality was now that its role was that of an NGO (to provide aid) rather than a governing body.

In Haris, FGD participates stated that the municipality had tried to use social media to communicate with residents but that it takes decisions unilaterally. Despite this, participants said they trusted the municipality given that it consistently provided support relevant to essential services and has expanded its role to take on more responsibilities of core government, including road maintenance, water resources, electricity management, and the distribution of aid.

In Miyeh-w-Miyeh FGD participants universally agreed that the municipality did not understand its role; although its employees were physically present, they were not meaningfully aware of what was happening in the town. When residents went to the municipality to complain, their concerns fell largely on deaf ears. They attributed this disconnect between citizens and municipal authorities to nepotistic hiring process.

Figure 44: Municipality's understanding of needs and provision of services based on this

In Abbasiyeh, Lebanese nationals were more likely than Syrians to believe that the municipality had skills and funding (by 38% to 17%). Syrians and women were also much less likely to wish to answer that question, with 24% of women and 38% of Syrians abstaining from a response (compared to 6% of men).

The trend was similar in Haris, by an even higher margin with 54% of Lebanese believing that the municipality had the skills and the funds, compared to only 21% of Syrians. Women were also slightly more likely to believe that the municipality had both (56%) compared to men (40%). Finally women were also more likely than men to abstain from responding (17% compared to 11% of men).

In Miyeh-w-Miyeh 78% Syrians believed the municipality had both skills and funds, compared with 40% for Lebanese. Coupled with the pervasive view amongst Syrians that the municipality didn't understand the needs of the local community, their perception that the municipality had both, the skills and funds to act, likely pointed to a cynicism with the municipality: it could help them, but it chose not to.

More females compared to males believe it has both skills and funds: 57% compared to 47%. More males compared to females see that it has skills but not funds: 14%, compared to 5% of women.

Figure 45: Perception of municipality's skill level and availability of funds to provide services, South*

*includes no-answer rates as these were much more significant in the South than in other communities.

7.5. Mount Lebanon

In Jdeidit el-Chouf more women (81%) than men (72%) believed the municipality understands priorities, though rates in Baaqline were broadly equal. Across both municipalities, slightly more women than men believed the municipality was able to provide local services: 59% women compared to 52% men.

In Baaqline although more Lebanese (62%) than Syrians (46%) believed the municipality understood priorities, more Syrians (31%) than Lebanese (25%) believed the municipality could provide services accordingly. Conversely, in Jdeidet el-Chouf more Lebanese than Syrians—14% to 6%— believed the municipality could provide relevant services.

In Baaqline, FGD participants said that MSLD was more specialised and successful in identifying needs, whereas even though the municipality was trying to engage the public, it lacked the skills to do so. In Jdeidet el-Chouf, FGD participants attributed reduced engagement with COVID-19 and the economic crisis which had resulted in the halting of many activities. They said, however, that the municipality was trying to identify needs and priorities, particularly through its work with the UNDP.

Figure 46: Municipality's Understanding of needs and provision of services based on this

Legend: ■ 2021 ■ 2022

JDEIDIT EL CHOUF: 50% (2021), 76% (2022)
BAAQLINE: 63% (2021), 61% (2022)
THE MUNICIPALITY UNDERSTANDS THE PRIORITIES AND NEEDS OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

JDEIDIT EL CHOUF: 15% (2021), 12% (2022)
BAAQLINE: 25% (2021), 26% (2022)
THE MUNICIPALITY IS ABLE TO PROVIDE LOCAL SERVICES BASED ON THE LOCAL NEEDS AND PRIORITIES

In Jdeidet el-Chouf we found no material differences in the perceptions of men and women. In that community, Syrians were more likely to be critical of the municipal government and say that it had neither skills nor funds (91%, compared to 71% of the Lebanese) and less likely to state the municipality had skills but not funding (6% compared to 18% Lebanese).

Conversely, in Baaqline Syrians were more likely to believe that the municipality had both the skills and the funds (8%), compared to Lebanese (1%). They were also less likely to answer the question, with abstentions at 23%. The Lebanese in Baaqline were more likely to criticise local government for having the funds but no the skills (8%) compared to no Syrians who said this. Women in that community were also more likely to be pessimistic about skills and funding compared to men. For example, 57% of women said that the municipality lacked the skills and the funding, compared with 47% of men and 34% of women said that the municipality had the skills but not the funding, compared to a higher percentage of men who expressed confidence in local skills (39%). In this community also, we found that Syrians were much less likely to answer the question, with 23% abstaining from so doing, possibly due to a lack of visibility into the municipality's staffing and funding.

Figure 47: Perception of municipality's skill level and availability of funds to provide services; Mount Lebanon

7.6. Bekaa

Generally in the Bekaa as in other communities, men were more likely than women to believe that the municipality understood their priorities and could provide services. In Qob Elias, for example, 37% of men compared believe the municipality understood priorities compared to 14% of women, and 43% of men believed the municipality provided relevant services compared to 31% of women. One outlier here was in Qsarnaba where slightly more women than men: 27% to 21% men believed the municipality provided relevant services.

Unlike trends in the broader sample, in Chtoura Syrians were more likely to state that the municipality understood local priorities: 22% compared to 17% of Lebanese, and that they could provide relevant services: 32% compared to 20% of Lebanese. In Qob Elias and Qsarnaba, Lebanese were more likely to believe that the municipality understood and could provide local services.

In Chtoura, FGD participants agreed that there was very little engagement between the municipality and the community. In Qob Elias, participants were sceptical that any engagement would improve conditions; although some said that the lack of engagement was due to budget shortages, participants stated that there was a profound lack of trust between locals and the municipality, primarily because of political and sectarian tensions.

Finally, in Qsarnaba FGD participants all agreed that, unlike the previous municipality, the current municipality does not engage the community at all, even when citizens contact it directly. Participants lay the blame on the new Mayor whom they viewed as being disconnected from residents. They also described the municipality as indecisive which meant that it could not deal with problems robustly.

Figure 48: Municipality's Understanding of needs and provision of services based on this

In Chtoura, as in parts of the South, we found that Syrians and women were more likely to complement the municipality saying that they had both the skills and the funding (26% women, and 22% Syrians) compared to men (13%) and Lebanese nationals (16%). Women and Syrian community members were also more likely to abstain from answering the question (at 21% women and 23% Syrians). Of those who answered, women were also much less likely to criticise municipal government's skills: 18% said the municipality lacked funds but not skills, compared to 32% of men who said the same.

We found a similar dynamic in Qob Elias: 30% of Syrians said the municipality had funds and skills, compared to 11% of Lebanese. Women and Syrians were also more likely to abstain from answering (18% abstained in each cohort) compared to only 8% of men who abstained.

In Qsarnaba, more women than men (6% compared to 4% men) believed the municipality had, both, skills and funds. More women also believed the municipality had the skills but not the funds: 29% compared to 22% of men. Finally, more women also believed it had funds but not skills: 13% compared to 7% of men. More males, 60% to 40% women believed the municipality had neither. The Lebanese were more likely to believe the municipality had the skills but not funds: 31% to 3% Syrians, and Syrians were more likely to believe it had neither: 62%, compared to 51% of Lebanese respondents who said this was so.

Figure 49: Perception of municipality's skill level and availability of funds to provide services; Bekaa

8.   Community Engagement and Resident Agency

Changes in residents' perception of their agency (including their participation in the identification of needs and priorities).

8.1.   Perceived local engagement

In 2022, 20% of respondents agreed that the municipality had engaged the local community to identify priorities and needs.

This continued the trend of reduced local engagement, from 25% in 2021 and 34% in 2020, though the speed of the reduction slightly slowed.

Engagement rates decreased across the board by an average of 25%. Respondents in the South remained most likely to describe being engaged, 34%, an 8% reduction from 2021. On the other end of the scale, we saw the sharpest year-on-year drop in perceived engagement of 58%: this year respondents in Mount Lebanon overtook those in the Bekaa as least engaged.

Our regression analysis showed that perceived local engagement (through knowledge and / or participation in events) was critical to community members' outlook / optimism about their local community. We found significant positive correlations between participating in municipal events and feeling part of one's own town. We also found significant positive correlations between feeling part of the town and believe that one can make a difference in their community.

Table 21: Correlation between feeling part of the town and feeling able to make a difference and participating in municipal events

Participating in municipal activities	Pearson Correlation	0.141*
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000
Ability to make a difference	Pearson Correlation	0.167**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000

Finally, we also found that the less likely respondents felt they could make a difference in the town, the more pessimistic about their future in Lebanon.

Table 22: Correlation between feeling able to make a difference and future outlook

Pessimistic about future in Lebanon	Pearson Correlation	- 0.120**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000

On a community level, we found no year-on-year change in the communities with the highest engagement rates: Haris, 44%, Abbasiyeh, 42%, and Chekka, 36%. We also found the lowest engagement rates in Jdeidet el-Chouf, 2%, Chtoura, 4%, and Qsarnaba, 8%. Engagement increased slightly in Qob Elias, from 9% in 2021 to 15% in 2022.

Although broadly similar numbers of Syrians and Palestinians felt engaged by the municipality between 2021 and 2022 (averaging 12%), the gap has narrowed between refugee communities and the Lebanese given the reduction in the number of Lebanese who felt engaged by the municipality, from 32% in 2021 to 24% in 2022. Similarly, although in 2021 men were more likely to report that the local community was engaged in identifying priorities and needs (28% compared to 22% women), this year that gap has narrowed to 21% men and 18% women, a reduction across both genders.

Figure 50: Municipal engagement, by governorate

8.2. Knowledge and participation in municipal events

In 2022 we found a 27% increase in the number of respondents who reported not knowing of any event in their town, from 59% to 72%. This reverses the trend we saw between 2020 and 2021 where that value fell, from 63%. Despite the drop in knowledge of events, the likelihood of participating in events remained exactly as in 2020 and 2021: 14%.

As with 2021, awareness of events was highest in Mount Lebanon, 48%, followed by the South, 41%. It was lowest in the Bekaa, 11%, and the North, 14%. We saw the sharpest year-on-year drop in awareness in the North—a 68% drop—followed by the Bekaa, a 45% drop. Participation remained highest in the South, 22%, and Mount Lebanon, 14%: broadly on par with 2021 and exceeded 2020 participation levels. In the Bekaa and the North we saw no material year-on-year changes in participation rates (now at 11% and 5% respectively), the 2021 and 2022 rates are lower than those in 2020 (of 17% in the Bekaa and 12% in the North); this means that, after an initial fall in the likelihood of participating in community fora and events, the likelihood of participation stayed the same in these communities.

Figure 51: Knowledge and participation in events organised by the municipality, by governorate

Through our regression analysis, we found significant positive correlations between knowledge of local events and perceptions that the municipality was engaging the community; this was valid for both Syrians and Lebanese. We also found significant positive correlations between participating in events and the perception that the municipality was engaging communities.

Table 23: How perception about being engaged by the municipality is affected by two other variables: knowing about activities and / or participating in events

Knowing about municipal activities	Pearson Correlation	0.256**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000
Participating in municipal activities	Pearson Correlation	0.254**
	Significance (2 – tailed)	0.000

On a community level, we saw improved awareness of events in Miyeh-w-Miyeh form 25% in 2021 to 36% in 2022 (an increase of 43%). Baaqline's respondents were most likely to be aware of an event, 56%, followed by those in Abbasiyeh (50%), and respondents in Jdeidet el-Chouf, 39%. Conversely, knowledge was lowest in Qsarnaba, 9%, followed by Qalamoun, 10%.

Lebanese residents were much more likely than Syrians and Palestinians to be aware of an event; awareness of an event amongst Lebanese stood at 35% compared to 14% for Palestinians and 10% for Syrians. As with last year, men were also more likely to be aware of an event, 29%, compared to women, 25%. Finally, the older the cohort the more likely they were to be aware of events, with 18-29-year olds least likely to be aware, 20%, and the 50+ being most likely to be aware 34%

Participating in events remained most likely in Abbasiyeh followed by Baaqline, where 28% and 27% respectively so did. In Baaqline, 2022 levels of participation increased by 78% year-on year. We also saw a 75% increase in participation rates in Chtoura (from 8% in 2021 to 14% in 2021) and more modest increases in participation in Miyeh w Miyeh, from 19% in 2021 to

22% in 2022, in Qob Elias from 10% to 11% in 2022 and Qalamoun, from nil in 2021 to 2% in 2022.

We found the largest drop in participation—86%—in Jdeidet el-Chouf (where participation now stands at 2%), and a 58% drop in participation In participation in Qsarnaba (where it now stands at 7%).

As with the trends related to awareness of events, men were more like to participate (15%) than women (12%) and participation also increased by age, from 8% in the 19-29 cohort, to 17% in the 50+ cohort.

Figure 52: awareness of, and participation in, community events, by demographic attributes.

8.3. Perceptions of marginalisation

In 2022 we found significant changes in the groups that respondents believed were most marginalised. In 2021, the elderly were most likely to be described as marginalised, with 17% of respondents describing them as marginalised, followed by refugees, described as marginalised by 16% of respondents; 36% of the cohort said that no one was marginalised. In 2022, however, children topped that list: they were described as marginalised by 23% of respondents; the elderly followed (with 21%) of the vote, and refugees and disabled individuals came in joint third, with 16% of the vote.

Table 24: ranking group by perceived marginalisation

2020	2021	2022
Refugees, 28%	No-one, 36%	Children, 23%
Youth, 19%	Elderly, 17%	Elderly, 21%
Other, 16%	Refugees, 16%	Refugees, 16%
Elderly, 15%	Disabled persons, 7%	Disabled persons 16%
Women, 12%	Youth, 7%	Youth, 7%
The Disabled, 9%	Other, 6%	Women, 6%
A certain confession, 1%	Women, 5%	A certain confession, 6%
	Children, 1 %	Other, 3%
	A certain confession, 2%	

We saw significant shifts in perception of marginalisation even within nationalities. In 2021, Syrians were most likely to describe refugees as most marginalised, in 2022 they now describe disabled persons as most marginalised. In line with overarching trends, in 2021 the Lebanese were most likely to describe the elderly as most marginalised, and in 2022 this changed to children.

Figure 53: Whose needs are least considered in your local community: results by nationality.

As with last year, 50+ were still most likely to describe the elderly as marginalised, but this increased from 24% in 2021 to 36% in 2022. Youth were disproportionality likely to state that children were most marginalised, 30%, compared to an average of 21% in the rest of the cohort. We found limited differences in the views of men and women although men were women were more likely to describe themselves as marginalised (12% compared to 2% of men), and men were much more likely to state that refugees were marginalised: 18% compared to 10% women.

Figure 54: Whose needs are least considered in your local community; results by gender

■ Male   ■ Female

2021

2022

Figure 55: Whose needs are least considered in your local community; results by age group

■ 18 - 29   ■ 30 - 39   ■ 40 - 49   ■ 50+

	18 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50+
CHILDREN	30%	20%	22%	21%
PEOPLE FROM A CERTAIN CONFESSION	6%	6%	5%	7%
YOUTH	4%	8%	7%	10%
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES	20%	20%	18%	6%
REFUGEES	20%	19%	14%	9%
ELDERLY	10%	16%	20%	36%
WOMEN	8%	6%	7%	4%

8.4.   Governorate-level analysis

In the **Bekaa**, we found the highest levels of engagement by the municipality in Qob Elias, 15%, followed by Qsarnaba, 8%, and Chtoura, 4%. 90% of respondents were not aware of any local events, and of the remaining 10% were most likely to be aware of a townhall meeting, 6%, or a general community event, 4%. On a village level, Qsarnaba's residents were most likely to be aware of a townhall meeting, Chtoura residents were most likely to be aware of a general community event, and Qob Elias residents were most likely to be aware of a townhall meeting.

Finally, only 11% of those who were aware of meetings participated in one, with 4% participating in a townhall meeting or a community event, 3% in a

Figure 56: Engagement, Bekaa Governorate

public campaign, and 1% participated in a discussion on a new municipal project or MSLD meeting.

The Bekaa was most likely to rank refugees and the disabled as most marginalist, 26%, followed by the elderly.

Figure 57: Engagement, North Governorate

In the **North**, we found the highest levels of municipal engagement with Chekka (36%). Only 16% of Qalamoun residents said that the municipality had engaged the community to identify priorities and needs; this is on par with 2021 results.

Respondents in the North were most likely to be aware of a public campaign (9%). This is driven by Chekka, where 15% of respondents who knew about an event were aware of a public campaign. In Qalamoun, respondents were most likely to be aware of events to discuss new municipal projects (5%). Engagement in these events remained very low in both communities, though increased slightly in Qalamoun from nil in 2021 to 2% in 2022 (it remained static at 7% in Chekka). In Chekka, residents were more likely to participate in a public campaign than any other type of activity.

Residents in Qalamoun were most likely to describe disabled community members as the most marginalised, 28%, followed by individuals from a certain confession, 17%.[8] Those in Chekka overwhelmingly described youth as marginalised, 53%, followed by the disabled: 15%.

In the **South** the highest volume of respondents in our sample said that the municipality had engaged the local community in identifying priorities and needs: 34%. This engagement took place mainly in Haris, 44%, and Abbasiyeh, 42%, with engagement in Miyeh-w-Miyeh lagging, at 15%.

Residents in Miyeh-w-Miyeh were most likely to be aware of a townhall meeting, 31%, followed by discussions of new municipal projects, 17%; residents in Haris and Abbasiyeh were most likely to be aware of a community event or discussions of new municipal projects: 25% each in Haris and over 30% in Abbasiyeh.

In Miyeh-w-Miyeh, residents were most likely to participate in a townhall meeting, 19%, followed by a discussion of new municipal projects, 11%. In Haris and Abbasiyeh they were most likely to participate in discussions of new projects (9% Haris, 15% Abbasiyeh) or community events (9% Haris and 13% Abbasiyeh).

Figure 58: Engagement, South Governorate

Across all three communities, residents in the South believed that children were the most marginalised group: 45% in Haris, 39% in Abbasiyeh and 26% in Miyeh-w-Miyeh. Aside from children, 26% of respondents from Miyeh-w-Miyeh said that individuals from a certain confessional background were most marginalised.[9] In Haris and Abbasiyeh, the elderly and refugees came second with 11% each in both communities.

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[8] We understand that the majority of the Qalamoun community is Sunni, so this response may have reflected a feeling of disenfranchisement amongst the Shi'a minotiry

[9] This might be because Miyeh-w-Miyeh is a Christian constituency in a broader area dominated by Sunnis: this dynamic may have affected perceptions of marginalisation.

In **Mount Lebanon** only 8% of respondents said that the municipality has engaged the local community in identifying priorities and needs in the past year, with major differences between Baaqline and Jdeidet el-Chouf. In Baaqline, 15% agreed, whereas in Jdeidet el-Chouf only 2% agreed with that statement.

Figure 59: Engagement, Mount Lebanon

Residents in Mount Lebanon were most likely to be aware of a public campaign, 36%, followed by a townhall meeting, 24%, or community event 23%. Only 13% were aware of discussions on new municipal projects. Again, we found significant differences between the two communities. Residents in Baaqline were much more likely to be aware of a townhall meeting: 32% compared to 16% in Jdeidet el-Chouf; an MSR/MSLD Meeting 18% compared to 1%; discussions of new municipal projects: 16% compared to 9%; community events: 45% compared to 1%. The reasons for this are unclear.

In Baaqline, residents were most likely to participate in a community event, 16%, followed by a public initiative, 12%, townhall meeting, 10%, and an MSR/MSLD meeting, 7%. In Jdeidet el-Chouf, they were unlikely to participate in any events or meetings: 1% participated in a townhall meeting, discussion of new municipal projects or a public campaign

9. Project-Specific Questions

Impact of increased municipal services, livelihood opportunities and / or peacebuilding initiatives on residents' confidence in, or perception of the legitimacy of local government, including consideration of attribution.	Residents' assessments of their municipality's capacity to maintain and operate the assets used to provide the municipal services including the assets provided by LHSP.

This section considers whether, and how, municipal services affect confidence in local government and perceptions towards municipal authorities. We also consider links between select LHSP projects and residents' confidence in their municipality in service provision.

This year, we selected projects based on in-depth discussion with the UNDP's LHSP team prior to research implementation. Using the LHSP's focus projects helped us gather insights on specific areas of interest to the UNDP.

All data in this section are rounded to the nearest whole number and graphics generally exclude no-answer responses.

Table 25: The list of LHSP projects that respondents were asked about in their towns

Village	Project Name
Chtoura	Storm-water drainage
Qob Elias	Old Market rehabilitation + project to establish a sports playground and build a fence for the basketball stadium
Qsarnaba	Solid waste collection and recycling; agricultural cooperative project
Qalamoun	Fish market project
Chekka	Solid waste management and sorting
Abbasiyeh	Greenhouse project
Haris	Community centre
Miyeh-w-Miyeh	Street lighting installation
Jdeidet el-Chouf	Storm-water drainage
Baaqline	Rehabilitation of storm water systems

9.1. Awareness of interventions

Overall awareness of interventions increased in 2022, to 34%, from 32% in 2021. This continues a trend from 2020, when awareness stood at 31%. Respondents in the South were most likely to be aware of a project, followed by those in the Bekaa (at 58% and 61% respectively). Conversely, only 18% of respondents from the North were aware of a project, and 29% of those in Mount Lebanon.

Figure 60: Percentage of respondents aware of LHSP projects in their communities, by nationality

On a community level, we saw increases in all Bekaa communities, especially Qsarnaba; in Miyeh-w-Miyeh, Haris and Baaqline. We saw sharp decreases in Qalamoun and Jdeidet el-Chouf, and more gentle reductions in Chekka and Abbasiyeh.

Figure 61: Percentage of respondents aware of LHSP projects in their communities, Y-o-Y change

As with last year, Lebanese and Palestinians were much more likely to be aware of local projects. The Lebanese were 86% more likely to be so aware, and Palestinians, 52% more likely. Men were also more likely to be aware of local interventions: 39% compared to 26% of women said they know of local projects. Finally, youth aged 18-29 were least likely to be aware. Instead, awareness increased as the age cohort increased but peaked at the 40-49 age group, reducing slightly for the over 50s.

Figure 62: Percentage of respondents aware of LHSP projects in their communities, by demographic gender and age

9.2. Attribution

Public attribution of projects to the UNDP increased sharpy from 23% in 2021 to 42% in 2022. This continues a trend of increased awareness in the UNDP's involvement in local projects (initially baselined at 12% in 2020). In similar vein, attribution of projects to the municipality continued to decrease, from 58% in 2020, to 33% in 2021 and then 27% in 2022. We found the greatest awareness in UNDP and donor involvement in the Bekaa, at 71%, followed by Mount Lebanon, at 53%.

Figure 63: Attribution by governorate

On a community level, residents in Miyeh-w-Miyeh were most likely to attribute projects to the UNDP, at 63%, followed by those in Chtoura, 58%, and Qsarnaba 56%. Conversely, residents of Chekka were most likely to attribute interventions to municipal efforts, 48%, followed by Abbasiyeh, 43%, and Haris, 31%.

Men were much more likely than women to be aware of the UNDP's intervention, 46%, or to attribute projects to international donors, 14%; they were also less likely to attribute efforts to the municipality, 22%. Conversely, 36% of female respondents believed that interventions were due to municipal efforts, compared with 34% who believed they were due to the UDP and 8% who attributed these to international donors writ large. We found no clear trend by age group in relation to this.

Figure 64: Attribution by nationality, age and gender

9.3. Confidence

Of those who were aware of an intervention, 55% agreed with the statement that this increased their confidence in the municipality. This continued the trend of a reduction in the number of those who so believed, from 61% in 2020 and 70% in 2021. On the other end of the scale, we saw a steep increase in the number of those who disagreed with the statement, from 16% and 19% in 2020 and 2021 respectively, to 33% in 2022. Residents in the South were most likely to agree, at 74%, and those in the Bekaa were most likely to disagree, at 51%. Residents in the Bekaa were most evenly split, with 46% of them agreeing that the project increased their confidence in municipal capability.

Figure 65: confidence, by governorate

Figure 66: The project has increased my confidence in the ability of the municipality to deliver services

Both Lebanese and Syrians largely agreed that the project increased their confidence in municipal capability (55% and 57% respectively). Palestinians were overwhelmingly negative about this, however: 86% disagreed that the project favourably affected their confidence in municipal capability.

Women were slightly more likely to positively perceive the effect of the project: 56% of them agreed with the statement, compared to 54% of men; on the other end of the sale, they were also six points less likely to disagree with the statement (29% disagreed, compared to 35% of men). We saw a gentle positive correlation between age and the perception that projects increased confidence in the municipality's ability, with older age groups more likely to so agree (c. 56% compared to 49% in the youth cohort aged 18-29).

9.4. Observations by governorate

Of communities in the **Bekaa**, we saw significant increases in agreement and disagreement with the proposition that the project increased confidence. In Qob Elias, 46% agreed and 52% disagreed; in Qsarnaba 40% agreed and 59% disagreed. In both communities, disagreement increased significantly year-on-year, from 45% in Qob Elias and 59% in Qsarnaba. The picture in Chtoura is slightly more favourable: 61% of those aware of an intervention believed that it increased their confidence in the municipality, up from 42% in 2021.

In Qsranaba, interview participants stated that waste management was a priority but not a first choice: the preferred choice of rehabilitating agricultural road could not go ahead due to unresolved land ownership issues. FGD participants also stated that the processes for just projects had been very long and frequently changed which created local frustrations.

In Chtoura, interview participants stated that the water drainage project and road repaving was important and had some immediate impact, particularly on individuals with businesses in the areas, though less so on the broader community.

Perceptions were also favourable towards the sports centre in Qob Elias, with respondents saying that it is being constantly used. People seemed less aware of the planned renovations to the local market. FGD participants stated that rehabilitating the old souk was not a priority and that rehabilitating the sidewalks increased traffic (it was not clear to us whether the effort to rehabilitate the sidewalks was led by the UNDP. Participants wished that the money had been spent on more urgent priorities and that residents could be better consulted. Specifically, they outlined the need for solar energy panel, and making improvements to street lighting and the road network.

Figure 67: Project attribution in Bekaa Governorate

In the **North**, we saw significant reductions in agreement with this statement in Qalamoun, from 76% in 2021 to 5% in 2022. We found a smaller reduction against this measure in Chekka, from 76% in 2021 to 70% in 2022.

In Chekka, interviewees reported that, despite the hard work to train people and increase the levels of garbage sorting, this had all now reversed: local citizens saw that garbage was getting picked up together and mixed, which removed the incentive to separate waste.

In Qalamoun feedback was mixed about the relevance of the fish market rehabilitation effort: two interviewees said that this would improve the outlook in the town and stimulate jobs, and one said that, because Qalamoun was famous for its fish, there was no need for such a project. Rather that interviewee said it was better to focus on improving local fishing equipment, help open new kiosks to sell fish and / or food. Several interviewees said that the project has been held up by the police and so was yet to start. According to focus group discussions, locals in Qalamoun were staying away from the local markets due to safety concerns an increase in theft and a lack of municipal police.

Figure 68: Project attribution in North Governorate

In the **South**, agreement with the statement remained broadly the same in Hair, increased in Abbasiyeh, from 69% in 2021 to 85% in 2022, and decreased in Miyeh-w-Miyeh, from 69% to 45%. In that community, we also found a significant increase in the percentage of those who disagreed with the statement, from 14% in 2021 to 47% in 2022.

In Miyeh-w-Miyeh, focus group participants were aware though sceptical of the impact of a project to improve street lighting, particularly in the absence of a reliable electricity source. In Miyeh-w-Miyeh, although interviewees were supportive of the project, they criticised their implementation and maintenance; various interviewees reported that the contractor was not qualified which meant that they even damaged electrical equipment in the town; that maintenance was non-existent and that the lights were no longer working. One interviewee reported attempts to contact the UNDP to get this issue fixed, but with no success.

In Abbasiyeh, our interviewees were unanimous in the belief that the greenhouse project would improve food security, reduce prices and possible increase jobs, though one interviewee advised that there should be a committee to manage the greenhouse.

In Haris perceptions were mixed about the utility of a community centre: it was believed that the mayor unilaterally wished to turn the centre into a single-use location for textiles and sewing. One interviewee said:

"I don't think that the project will bring much employment and I would have rather seen the space be used for cultural and community activities instead, along with multipurpose use. Active people in the town sometimes come forward with ideas such as training in language skills, computer skills, development skills and there is no place to do those activities. The presence of a multi-purpose space would give us a location which functions as a community centre. It is a shame that the buildings was given an exclusive purpose."

Figure 69: Project attribution in South Governorate

In Mount Lebanon, negativity outweighed positivity: 48% of those who were aware of a project disagreed that it increased their confidence in the municipality's capacity, compared to 37% who agreed. Finally, in Mount Lebanon, we found a mixed picture in Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline. In Jdeidet el-Chouf, the volume of respondents who agreed with the proposition decreased from 38% in 2021 to 36% in 2022. In Baaqline, the volume of those who agreed with the statement nearly halved, from 67% in 2021 to 38% in 2022 and the number who disagreed with the statement doubled, from 22% to 45%.

Interviews in Baaqline reinforced the importance of the project given the issues related to water management. One recommendation was to consider more carefully the timing of project implementation including, for example, carrying out the works during school holidays to minimise the disruption caused to traffic.

According to interviews in Jdeidet el-Chouf, the water issue was important but now the garbage and electricity crises outweigh it. Participants also highlighted issues with the project's implementation, saying that it was not able to continue due to a trespassing concern. That said, multiple streets were fixed so many people benefitted. In future, one interviewee recommended improving cooperation and community engagement on the project to avoid the potential that one individual could stop the intervention / others from benefitting.

Figure 70: Project attribution in Mt. Lebanon Governorate

10. Tensions and Violence

Changes in the nature and levels of tension, and social stability (e.g. positive interactions, violent incidents, inclusion of different groups – including refugees - in LHSP structures and activities) more broadly, between and among host communities and Syrian refugees.

As in 2021 (although with a 10% higher result), respondents in the Bekaa were most likely to report tensions between communities. In 2021 this perception was significantly higher in Chtoura (82% compared with 45% in Qob Elias). In 2022 the perception was much more evenly split and with those perceiving intra-community tensions in Chtoura falling to 49% and those in Qob Elias rising slightly to 46%. This shows a significant reduction in Chtoura. Mount Lebanon remained the second highest: 22% in Baaqline and 37% Jdeidet el-Chouf.

There is a significant shift since 2021 from the perception of intra-community tensions being higher between Lebanese and Syrians, to tensions being perceived as higher between Lebanese in 2022. This trend exists in all regions, bar the South where responses to both questions totalled at 9%.

All data in this section are rounded to the nearest whole number and graphics generally exclude no-answer responses.

Figure 71: Perception of intra-community tensions

While 66% of Lebanese respondents disagreed that there were tensions between Lebanese and Syrians, double the number of Syrian respondents, 44%, to Lebanese respondents, 22%, thought that tensions did exist between Lebanese and Syrians. In Bekaa although the percentage of those in Qob Elias and Chtoura perceiving tensions between Lebanese and Syrians (52% and 53%) instead of between Lebanese (48% and 49%), in Qalamoun 49% of respondents perceived tensions as being high between Lebanese, compared to only 29% who said that there were tensions between Lebanese and Syrians.

Figure 72: % Respondents who believed that there are tensions between Lebanese residents in their community

10.1. Witnessing or being party to a dispute

Respondents were also asked whether they had been party, or witness, to disputes between Lebanese in their communities. This was to identify any alignment or otherwise between perceptions of conflict and the reality of conflict. In 2022, 18% reported that they had not been party to a dispute, an increase from 9% in 2021, and on par with 2020 levels (when the no-dispute rate was 19%).

As with 2020 and 2021, Chtoura was the location with the highest percentage of those reportedly involved in, or aware of, a dispute (although this figure has fallen 29% since 2021) and the lowest remained in the South. In contrast to previous years, the South were the only areas with no-answer rates to this question—reaching 5% in Haris—which may suggest a higher-than-reported rate of disputes.

Figure 73: Have you been part of, or a witness to, a dispute between a Lebanese and Syrian in your community in the last six months?

Focus group participants echoed the view that disputes had reduced across communities. In Abbasiyeh, for example, participants said that Syrians and Lebanese were now facing the same economic crises and that Syrians had begun to assimilate within the community. Reports of solidarity across nationalities also came from the Chtoura and Miyeh-w-Miyeh FGDs. In other areas such as Baaqline, the reduction in disputes was the result of increased restrictions on Syrians' free movement: in that community, there was an 8pm curfew for local Syrians; we also found a curfew in Haris. Participants in Qob Elias stated that the strength of the relationship with Syrians dependent on whether the latter were integrated into the community or lived in refugee camps, with the more closely integrated having better relationships.

10.2. Causes of disputes

FGD participants reported that perceptions of Lebanese marginalisation continued to trigger disputes, though less so than in 2021. In Baaqline, one participant said she once observed a fight between a Syrian and Lebanese in front of a supermarket. The Syrian had bought several items and when the Lebanese person saw the items and realised he could not afford them, he got frustrated and started a fight. Similar disputes were reported in Chekka and Jdeidet el-Chouf.

In Chekka, a trigger for disputes, particularly amongst students, was reportedly a language barrier (with the Lebanese in that community conversing mostly in French compared to the Syrians' Arabic) and accents (with Lebanese students making fun of Syrian accents). Chekka participants also said that the uneven distribution of aid was creating tensions, triggering fights in front of several banks and supermarkets.

In Chtoura, there was a perception that Syrians did not 'pay into' the municipality system and therefore should not be entitled to the same services.

Resentment towards Syrians seemed most acute in Jdeidet el-Chouf where FGD participants were embittered by the perception that Syrians received "aid for food, schools, stationary, transportation… even a monthly salary in dollars, whereas the Lebanese are receiving nothing." Participants also believed that Syrians were being employed more frequently because they command lower rates; they believed that Syrians should "back off" and let more Lebanese people get jobs given the help they receive from UNHCR. In that community, one FGD participant stated she believed that tensions were triggered by fake news. Similar sentiments were also echoed in Qalamoun.

In Qsarnaba, FGD participants stated that there had been a shift in the social dynamic of the town, from political clientelism to family tribalism. This had adversely affected the town on all levels including increasing tensions and deteriorating services.

10.3. Resolving disputes

Overall, when the respondents had a dispute, they sought help from family, 28%, an increase from 14% in 2021. This is more in line with the response rate during the first 2020 survey of 25%. This may suggest that respondents were more cautious about interacting with families during the peak of COVID-19, but have since returned to their previous coping strategies. This is most noticeable in the South where the number of respondents saying they would turn to family were 11% in 2020, 3% in 2021 and 14% in 2022. As in previous years, results suggested family relations remained more influential in the North, 28%; those in the South were almost just as likely to turn to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), 13%, as they were their family, 14%.

There was also a noticeable reduction of respondents turning to friends and neighbours, which had increased by 3% between 2019 and 2021. Compared to 2021, half the number of respondents in 2022 said they would turn to friends and neighbours: 12%. Lebanese respondents represented the smallest proportion of respondents who would turn to friends and neighbours, down from 25% in 2021 to 10% in 2022. This could link to the increase in intra-community tensions between Lebanese respondents also picked up by our survey. Bekaa was the only region where we did not see a significant drop in respondents who would turn to friends and neighbours. There was also a drop in respondents turning to local civil society, from 11% 2021 to 2% in 2022. Most respondents who would turn to local civil society were based in the North, specifically in Chekka: 12%.

There was a rise in the number of respondents turning to the LAF from 3% in 2021 to 10% in 2022. This rise in respondents turning to more authorities may have resulted from fewer people isolating due to COVID-19 and centres being more accessible.

Figure 74: When you have had a dispute with someone in your community, who have you resorted to?

Lebanese and Syrians addressed disputes differently. The data suggest that Syrians felt more supported by the international community and social structures when it comes to disputes. 13% of Lebanese community members would not turn to any authority following a dispute compared to only 3% of Syrians. Compared to Lebanese respondents, Syrian respondents were likely to turn to international NGOs, 7%, or local civil society, 16%. There was an overall rise in both Lebanese (10%), Syrians (6%), and Palestinians (59%), who reported turning to the LAF in 2022, which suggests an increase of trust in the LAF. The highest number of respondents who would turn to the LAF were based in Miyeh-w-Miyeh (39%), which where most of our Palestinian responders were based), and in Jdeidet el-Chouf (24%).

Finally, although women and men were equally likely to turn to the municipality or LAF to resolve a dispute, women were much more likely to turn to family, 41%, compared to men, 18%. In a significant shift to 2021 when women were 17% more likely to turn to friends and neighbours than men, in 2022 the figures were much more even, with men being marginally more likely to return to friends and neighbours: 13% compared to 10%. This may be due to women's increased participation in social and economic life outside the home post-Covid (a time when many women had to stay at home to work and educate their children). Critically, there was a significant increase in the number of correspondents who felt like they could not turn to anyone, from 5% in 2021 to 10% in 2022. This was the highest in Mount Lebanon, at 21%. A closer look at data shows that many such respondents were Lebanese.

Figure 75: Dispute resolution by sex, nationality and age

10.4. North

Although there was a reported rise in tensions between Lebanese and Syrians across our respondents in the North In 2021 there was a particularly noticeable rise in in Qalamoun, from 20% in 2021 to 36% in 2022 of respondents agreeing that tensions exist. There was also a drop of 18% in respondents disagreeing that tensions existed. Looking at overall averages, it appears that this result was driven by a shift in Syrian (44%) and Palestinian (55%) respondents, with the number of Lebanese disagreeing tensions exist staying at the same 63% rate it was at in 2021. In contrast, in Chekka there were more respondents in 2022 disagreeing that tensions existed between Lebanese and Syrians, from 78% in 2021 to 82% in 2022.

Figure 76: there are tensions between Lebanese and Syrians, North Governorate

In 2022 we found less of a difference between the number of Syrians and Lebanese who reported tensions or who witnessed disputes between Lebanese and Syrians compared to 2021. Whereas in 2021 there was a 15-point difference in the number of Lebanese and Syrians reporting witnessing disputes: 10% Lebanese and 25% Syrian, in 2022 the response rates were more evenly matched: 9% Lebanese and 10% Syrian, suggesting either a decrease in disputes or a lack of confidence in reporting disputes.

Figure 77: % respondents who witnessed or were part of a dispute between Lebanese and Syrians, North

Despite the rise perceived tensions in the Qalamoun, there was a decrease in the number of respondents reporting having witness a dispute between Syrians and Lebanese (from 14% in 2021 to 6% in 2022). This could be explained by tensions being higher between Lebanese themselves, with 41% of respondents in Qalamoun agreeing that there were tensions between Lebanese within their own community.

10.5. South

As in 2021, respondents in the South reported fewer tensions and disputes between Lebanese and Syrians compared with other governorates, 9%. However, there was a noticeable shift from no Syrians reporting tensions in 2021, to Syrians reporting tensions across Abbasiyeh, Miyeh-w-Miyeh and Haris. Again, it was commonly perceived that Syrians competed with Lebanese for jobs as they were willing to be paid less which threatened Lebanese livelihoods. Noticeably, respondents from the South were the only ones to respond with 'no answer' when asked about witnessing a dispute with Syrians in the last 6 months. The above suggests there is a nervousness amongst the Syrian community in the south to speak about tensions and violence form the host community.

Figure 78: there are tensions between Lebanese and Syrians, South Governorate*

Note: in 2021, no Syrians in the South said that there were tensions with Lebanese.

Figure 79: % respondents who witnessed or were part of a dispute between Lebanese and Syrians, South*

*Note: in 2021, no Syrians in Miyeh-w-Miyeh and Haris said they witnessed or were part of a dispute with Lebanese.

10.6. Mount Lebanon

There was a significant decrease in rates of disputes with Syrians reported in Mount Lebanon compared to 2021, down from 24% to 6%. There is a noticeable trend of fewer Lebanese reporting tensions between Lebanese and Syrians across Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline although Syrian respondent's figures were more aligned with 2021 results.

Although Syrians were more likely to report tensions in 2022 (54% of Syrians in Mount Lebanon said there were tensions compared to 44% in 2021), all cohorts were much less likely to have witnessed or been part of an inter-community dispute. This suggests that the expectation of conflict and the experience of conflict were not matching up. This might be because Syrian refugees have been increasingly leaving the Mount Lebanon are which is reducing disputes, though the Syrians who remained in the area continued to feel a higher rate of tension, particularly in Jdeidet el-Chouf,

Figure 80: there are tensions between Lebanese and Syrians, Mount Lebanon

Figure 81: % respondents who witnessed or were part of a dispute between Lebanese and Syrians, Mount Lebanon

There is a notable drop (from 31% in 2021 to 9% in 2022) of respondents having witness or been part of a dispute between Lebanese and Syrians in Jdeidit el-Chouf, although this drop is mostly driven by Lebanese respondents. There was also a significant drop in Baaqline, from 16% to 3%.

10.7. Bekaa

Bekaa reported the highest perceptions of tensions, 46%, and experience of disputes, 17%, between Lebanese and Syrians.

Although rates of perceived tensions between Lebanese and Syrians dropped in Chtoura from 82% in 2021 to 53% in 2022, they rose in both Qob Elias and Qsarnaba by 4 points. As in 2021, in Chtoura more Lebanese (59%) than Syrians (48%) perceived tensions.

A higher number of Lebanese reporting having witnessed a dispute between host and refugee communities than Syrians across Bekaa. The highest share of Syrians who had witnessed disputes between the two groups was in Qob Elias (12%), where 30% of Lebanese respondents reported to having witnessed a dispute. Overall however, the number of disputes witness had dropped across Bekaa, most significantly in Qob Elias, down from 32% in 2021 to 19% in 2022.

Figure 82: there are tensions between Lebanese and Syrians, Bekaa

Figure 83: respondents who witnessed *or were part of a* dispute between *Lebanese and Syrians, Bekaa*

10.8. Perceptions of violence

Our survey asked respondents whether they believed that violence was an acceptable way to resolve disputes (see Section 10.1, above). Later in the survey, we also asked whether respondents had themselves used violence to resolve disputes. Asking these two questions enabled us to furnish this report with additional data on the difference between perceptions and actions.

We found near-universal disagreement with the statement that violence was an acceptable form of dispute resolution, although this figure rose by 3 percentage points overall since 2021. The 5% of those who agreed to violence being an acceptable way to resolve disputes is much closer to the 2020 figure of 4%, suggesting the drop in rates in 2021 could have been a result of less interaction between communities due to COVID-19.

Respondents in North—96%—were most likely to disagree with this statement and respondents in the South—73%—were least likely to disagree with that statement.

Figure 84: Violence is an acceptable way to resolve disputes

Across our results we saw an increase in the number of participants reporting violence as an acceptable way to resolve disputes to 2021, with the most notable increases in the North and South.

Figure 85: I have resorted to violence to resolve a dispute

11. Taking an Integrated Approach to Programming

Impact of integrated approach (municipal policing, violence-free schools and local media support) on social stability in select municipalities.	Impact of municipal policing support on residents' sense of community safety and security.

In Chekka, Qob Elias and Qalamoun, UNDP is implementing elements of an integrated programme to support municipal government. The integrated approach comprises projects to promote violence-free schools (VFS), efforts to support municipal police and projects to increase resilience against fake news. During last year's assessment, project plans were embryonic, but in the 2020/2021 financial year, UNDP began implementing projects to reduce violence in schools and counter-fake news initiatives, while continuing its support to the Municipal Police.

11.1. Violence-Free Schools

In 2022 we saw an increase in the percentage of respondents who agreed with the proposition that violence was an acceptable form of discipline in schools, from 2% in 2021 to 5%. Crucially, those who disagreed with that statement reduced by six percentage points, to 90%, even lower than the 2020 rate of 93%.

Residents in the North were most likely to disagree with the proposition that violence was an acceptable form of discipline: 99% disagree, followed by those in Mount Lebanon, 96% disagree.

We found a slight increase in the percentage of those who believed that violence in schools reinforced violence in the community, from 81% in 2021 to 88% in 2021. Agreement with this statement was highest in the Bekaa (91%), though a closer look at the data shows that this rate was a six-point reduction on the previous year when 97% of respondents agreed with that statement.

We found the largest increase in agreement with that statement in the South from 70% in 2021 to 89% in 2022: a 29% difference. Perceptions also become more favourable in the North where they increased by 18% year-on-year, form 66% in 2021 to 77% in 2022.

Finally, we also found an increase in the percentage of those who agreed that reducing violence in schools would contribute to reducing violence in the community, from an average of 84% in 2021 to 87% in 2022. This continued the increase from the 2020 baseline of 79%. Agreement with that statement was highest in Mount Lebanon: 93%, a 2% increase on the previous year.

We saw more acute increases in the North and South, of 18% and 11% respectively; in 2022 81% of respondents in the North agreed with that statement compared to 68% in 2021, and 85% of those in the South so agreed, compared to 77% in 2021. Although 90% of those in the Bekaa agree with the view that reducing violence in school would contribute to reducing

violence in the community, this was a 7% reduction on 2021 values. As we'll see below, these changes in the Bekaa were mainly driven by the Chtoura sample.

Figure 86: Perceptions of violence in schools

On an aggregate level, women were as likely as men to agree that violence was acceptable discipline: 5%. Youth and the over 50s were less likely to agree that this was so, at 4% agreement. Women were also as likely as men to agree that violence in schools reinforced violence in the community (88%) and we found no notable differences by age group in this regard, with 19-39-year olds being only one percent less likely to agree with this statement, 87%, compared to the over 40s: 88%. Both men and the over 50s were slightly more likely than women and the under 50s to agree that reducing school violence would result in a reduced community violence: 88% compared to 87%. The differences in this regard are insignificant.

Syrians were more likely than the Lebanese and Palestinians to agree that violence was an acceptable form of discipline: 7% compared to 4% Lebanese and 5% Palestinians.[10] Palestinians were most likely to believe that school violence reinforced community violence: 91%, compared to 88% of Lebanese and 86% of Syrians who so believed. Palestinians were also most likely to believe that reducing school violence would reduce community violence: 91% compared to 89% of Lebanese and 83% of Syrians. That being said, 10% of Syrians in our 2022 sample described themselves as neutral.

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[10] That being said, 32% of Syrians described themselves as neutral on the topic.

The view that violence was an acceptable form of discipline was most prevalent in the Bekaa, where 8% agreed with the statement, a rate driven by Chtoura where 18% of respondents agreed compared to 3% in Qsarnaba and only 2% in Qob Elias. Although residents in the Bekaa were most likely to agree that violence was an acceptable form of discipline, they were also most likely to agree that violence in schools reinforced violence in the community (91%). The highest rates of agreement with that statement was found in Qsarnaba, 96%, followed by Qob Elias, 92%. Chtoura lagged at 85%. It was therefore unsurprising to find that residents in Qsarnaba were also most likely to agree that reduced school violence would reduce community violence, 98%, and those in Chtoura were least likely to so agree: 84%.

Figure 87: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools, Bekaa

Rates were likewise high in the South, where 6% of individuals agreed with the proposition, and 13% were neutral (compared to 1% in all the remaining governorates). In the South, residents in Abbasiyeh were most likely agree with that statement (10%) compared to those in Haris (5%) and Miyeh-w-Miyeh (2%). Residents in Miyeh-w-Miyeh were most likely to be neutral on the topic, 21%, followed by those in Haris, 13%.

Residents in Miyeh-w-Miyeh were most likely to agree that there was a positive link between school and community violence (95%) whereas those in Abbasiyeh were least likely to so agree (86%). Similarly, 97% of those in Miyeh-w-Miyeh agreed that reducing school violence would reduce community violence, compared to only 78% in Abbasiyeh: the second lowest rate across our sample, after Qalamoun's 73%.

Figure 88: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools, South Governorate

- ■ Violence is acceptable discipline
- ■ Violence in schools reinforces violence in the community
- ■ Reducing violence in schools contributes to reducing violence in community

Respondents from North Governorate were most likely to disagree with the statement that violence was an acceptable form of discipline: 99%. We found no significant difference by community. That said, we found significant differences in views about whether there was a link between school violence and community violence. Residents in Chekka were most likely to agree that there was a positive relationship between the two, at 85%, compared to only 69% of those in Qalamoun. Even within Chekka we found a high rate of disagreement with this view, at 15% (the Qalamoun rate was 30%). Finally, Chekka's residents were also more likely to agree that reducing school violence would have a knock-on effect on community violence: 89%, compared to 73% of those in Qalamoun.

Figure 89: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools, Northern Governorate

- ■ Violence is acceptable discipline
- ■ Violence in schools reinforces violence in the community
- ■ Reducing violence in schools contributes to reducing violence in community

We found larger variations in views within our Mount Lebanon sample: residents in Baaqline were more likely to agree, and less likely to disagree, with the proposition that violence was acceptable difference. 4% of those in Baaqline agreed with this proposition, compared to 1% in Jdeidet el-Chouf; 93% disagreed compared to 99% in Jdeidet el-Chouf.

Residents in Jdeidet el-Chouf were also more likely to agree that there was a link between school and community violence: 96% compared to 84% of those in Baaqline, and to believe that reducing school violence would reduce community violence: 95% compared to 90% of those in Baaqline.

Figure 90: Perceptions of violence and violence in schools, Mount Lebanon

According to our interviewees, teacher violence was decreasing due to fears that any such reports would go on social media to great embarrassment for the school and the teacher. Most interviewees said that there was no violence in schools though some agreed that bullying and student violence was more prevalent. One interviewee in Chekka suggested that the curriculum should be changed to focus more on the issue of violence as teachers addressing this topic currently do so outside the curriculum and of their own volition. There was also an increased perception amongst interviewees in Chekka, that students were increasingly struggling with mental health issues but that parents and schools both lacked the resources to bring in specialist support.

In Qalamoun two interviewees said that kids were no longer attending schools and were more likely to be found running around on the streets during the day, with some getting into fights outside the school which increased the need for police presence. One interviewee said: "maybe they are getting hit at home so that is why they find it normal to hit others."

11.2. Municipal Police

In 2022 the rates of those who agreed that the municipal police (MP) were credible and organised continued to reduce; 2020 to 2021 saw a reduction in credibility of 17%, and this reduction increased to 22% from 2021 to 2022. MP credibility reduced most sharply in Mount Lebanon, by 49% to 30%; this was followed by an 18% reduction in the Bekaa to 32% driven by a 42% reduction in credibility in Chtoura.

Figure 91: Municipal police are credible

Trust in the MP's ability to resolve disputes also continued to decrease year on year, from 57% in 2021 to 40% in 2022. It was lowest in the Bekaa, 22%, followed by Mount Lebanon, 30%. It was highest in the South, 57% and the North 52%.

Figure 92: I trust the municipal police to resolve disputes

Finally, we also saw a 29% year on year reduction in the respondents who felt safe seeing the MP, from 40% in 2021 to 31% in 2020. Residents in the North were most likely to agree that they felt safe when they saw the MP, 53%, and those in Mount Lebanon were least likely to so agree, at 14%. Interestingly, despite most strongly agreeing that the MP were credible and trusted, only 24% of respondents in the South said they felt safe seeing the MP.

Figure 93: I feel safe when I see the municipal police

Lebanese nationals were much more likely to judge the MP as credible: 45% compared to Syrians, 39%, and Palestinians, 5%. Lebanese were more likely to trust the MP to resolve disputes: 41% compared to 38% of Syrians and 5% of Palestinians. Interestingly, however, Syrians were more likely to feel safe seeing the MP: 58% said they felt safe seeing the MP compared to 51% of Lebanese. Only 5% of Palestinians felt safe seeing the MP. That being said, lack of belief in the MP's ability to resolve disputes was high across both Lebanese and Syrian communities: 30% of Syrians and 27% of Lebanese did not trust the police to resolve disputes.

Men were also more likely to judge the police to be credible, 46%, compared to women, 39%. Women were also more likely than men to disagree with the statement that the police were credible: 26% of women disagreed, compared to 23% of men. Men were also more likely to trust the MP to resolve disputed, though the gap in perceptions against this measure narrowed, with 41% of men trusting the MP to resolve disputes compared to 39% of women. Men and women were equally likely to feel safe seeing the MP: 52% each.

Finally, youth and the over 50s were less likely to agree with that statement with an average of 39% agreeing that the MP were credible compared to 46% of the 30-49 cohort. The over 30 cohort was also more likely to trust police to resolve disputes c. 41%, compared to the under 29 cohort, 36%. The over 30-49-year old cohort was also more likely to feel safe around the MP, 54% compared to 50% among the under 29s and the over 50s.

Figure 94: Credibility, Trust, Safety by Nationality

*Note: the figures for Palestinians represented the small sample of 14 individuals in Miyeh-w-Miyeh

Constituents in the South were most likely to judge the MP as credible, with 60% agreeing with the statement that they were so. This, however, is still a 4% reduction on the previous year, though that reduction was not as steep as in 2020 to 2021, when perception of police credibility reduced by 16%. In our sample, however, we saw large differences between perceptions in Haris and Abbasiyeh, and those in Miyeh-w-Miyeh. In the latter, only 25% found the police to be credible, compared with 79% of those in Haris and 76% of those in Miyeh w Miyeh. In Haris, this perception was broadly unchanged; in Abbasiyeh, we saw a 13% year-on-year improvement, and in Miyeh-w-Miyeh, we found a 44% reduction in perceptions of credibility

Trust in the police's ability to resolve dispute decreased slightly in the South (by 2%), from 59% in 2021 to 57% in 2022. Again, we saw significant differences across communities: those in Haris were most likely to trust the police to resolve a dispute: 74%, only two percentage points down from 2021 and 68% of those in Abbasiyeh so trusted the police (up 6% from 2021). Only 28% of those in Miyeh-w-Miyeh, however, trusted the police to resolve disputed, down from 41%--a 30% year-on-year reduction. Finally, only 28% of those in Miyeh-w-Miyeh felt safe seeing the police compared to 68% in Abbasiyeh and 72% of those in Haris.

Figure 95: Credibility, trust and safety, South Governorate

In the Bekaa, we saw reductions in the perception that police were credible in Qob Elias (where 55% agreed that they were so, a reduction of 6% on the previous year), and in Chtoura, where 31% so agreed: a 42% reduction from 2021. We saw small improvements in Qsarnaba from nil persons believing the police were credible in 2021, to 4% so doing. This question was not, however, relevant to the community as they did not have an indigenous MP.

We saw steep reductions in trust that the municipal police could resolve disputes, particularly in Chtoura, from 62% in 2021 to 17% in 2020; rates in Qob Elias also deteriorated, falling from 62% in 2021 to 44% in 2022. That being said, both communities continued to largely feel safe seeing MP: 64% in Chtoura and 76% in Qob Elias.

Figure 96: Credibility, trust and safety, Bekaa Governorate

In the North, the 16% improvement in perceptions of credibility seen between 2020 to 2021 was reversed in this reporting period, which saw a 28% reduction in perceptions of police credibility. The drop was sharpest in Qalamoun, where MP credibility took a 48% hit between 2021 and 2022, falling from 59% to 31%. The reduction in Chekka was gentler: 11%, from 72% to 64%.

Conversely, trust in MP ability to resolve disputes fell much more sharply in Chekka than Qalamoun, from 82% in 2021 to 54% in 2022: a 34% reduction. In Qalamoun we saw an 18% year-on-year decrease from 61% to 50%. Finally, although most respondents in Chekka (66%) continued to feel safe seeing municipal police, this was not the case in Qalamoun where, in 2022, 48% said they felt safe seeing them: a 30% reduction on the previous year's 61%.

Figure 97: Credibility, trust and safety, North Governorate

Only 30% of respondents in Mount Lebanon believed that MP were credible and organised, a reduction in c.50% in both communities. Perceptions of credibility decreased were worse and decreased more steeply in Jdeidet el-Chouf, from 43% in 2021 to 31%% in 22 (a 51% reduction). In Baaqline, 39% of respondents continued to believe they were credible and organised: a 48% reduction from 76% in 2021.

We saw decreases in over 50% in trust in the municipal police across both communities, from 47% to 20% in Jdeidet el-Chouf, and from 79% to 39% in Baaqline. Only 21% of Jdeidet el-Chouf's residents felt save seeing MP, a 65% reduction from 2021 (when the rate was 60%). The drop was gentler in Baaqline: 67% of its residents continue to feel sage seeing the municipal police, a 16% reduction to 2021 (when the rate stood at 71%).

Figure 98: Credibility, trust and safety, Mount Lebanon

Generally, across the board, the view was that MP played an important local role, that they were under-resourced, and that there were not enough police. Qsarnaba and Miyeh-w-Miyeh bucked this trend.

According to FGDs, that Qsarnaba lacked a police force was perceived begrudgingly favourably: participants stated that the presence of a police force would result int local families fighting to fill the vacancies in the force. In Miyeh-w-Miyeh, FGD participants stated that the police were not fulfilling their role, despite the increase in their number. Instead, participants said that they should be more proactive, patrol the streets, engage with citizens and focus on improving overall safety levels. As previously mentioned, FGD participants in Qalamoun called for more police, particularly around the local market, to reduce theft and help people feel safe to roam around. Issues in Miyeh-w-Miyeh may be due to the dissolution of the municipality, with the town now administered by the regional governor; we understand that not all the 14 MP who had existed under the municipality had been effectively transferred to the new structure.

Separately, in Baaqline, interviewees said that the performance of the MP had improved after training; in Abbasiyeh there were reports of fewer MPs in the ground; and, in Qob Elias, MP were reported to be powerless and incapable of managing tensions between feuding families and political parties given the balance of power in the town towards local militias and families, rather than public institutions.

11.3. Fake news

We found a year-on-year increase in the perception that there was fake news the media, from an average of 65% in 2021, to 73% in 2022. The change in perception was steepest in the south, where we found a 43% increase in those who said there was fake news (from 30% in 2021 to 43% in 2022). The North bucked this trend however as perceptions of fake news in that governorate decreased by 4% (mainly driven by a fall in Qalamoun).

Perceptions that there was **fake news in the media** increased across all nationalities, though particularly amongst Syrians. 79% of Syrians reported that there was fake news in the media, a 14% increase on the previous year. 71% of Lebanese agreed that this was so, a 12% increase on 2021 and 45% of Palestinians so agreed, an increase of 4% from the previous year. Palestinians were most likely to be neutral on the matter: with 50% opting for this option.

Figure 99: There is a fake news in the media

We found no significant differences by gender or age, though we found the greatest difference in the perceptions of the 50s and the 30-39 cohort. Over 50s were least likely to agree that there as fake news in the media (66%) whereas the 20-39 cohort was most likely to so agree (79%).

The percentage of respondents who reported that fake news had **increased tensions in their community** also increased year on year by two percentage points, to 64% in 2022. Mount Lebanon continued to report the highest levels of fake news-induced tensions: 85%, a 14% increase on the previous year, and, followed by the Bekaa: 79% an 8% increase on 2021. Although respondents in the South were least likely to report that fake news had increased tensions in their community, we found a significant change in this view year-on-year; the view that fake news increase tension changed from 22% in 2021 to 40% in 2022: an increase of over 78%.

Figure 100: Fake news increased tensions in my community

As above, Syrians were slightly more likely to report that fake news increased tensions in their community, 68%, compared to 63% of Lebanese and 41% of Palestinians. 55% of Palestinians were neutral on this question. Men were also more likely to agree with that statement: 66%, a 12% increase on the previous year. Women were 4% less likely to agree with

the statement that fake news increased tension in their community this year, although 62% of them agreed with this statement. Finally, the 30-39 cohort was most likely to agree with this statement: 68%, compared to an average of 63% in all the other age groups.

Across the board, we found a one-point increase in the likelihood of being aware of, or part of, a fact-checking campaign, to 26% in 2022. The increase was driven by a doubling in the number of respondents in the South who reported knowing about or being part of one such campaign from 16% in 2021 to 34% in 2022. Awareness / participation fell, however by 45% in Mount Lebanon to 11%, 19% in the Bekaa, to 28%, and 14% in the North, to 25%.

We found a four-point difference in the awareness / participation in a fact-checking campaign amongst Lebanese (26%) and Syrians (22%). Palestinians were most likely to know, or be part, or a fact checking campaign (64%).

Men (28%) were more likely than women (23%) to know of or participate in such a campaign, and the 30-39 cohort were also more likely to be aware of participate in such a campaign: 40% compared to 35% of 18-29 cohort or the over 50s.

Figure 101: I am aware/ part of a fact checking campaign

Figure 102: Fake news related questions, by age

The Bekaa saw the highest reports of fake news in the media, an increase across all three communities. The increase was sharpest in Qsarnaba, form 82% in 2021 to 90% in 2022, followed by Qob Elias, from 82% to 93%. Chtoura saw the gentlest increase, from 91% to 94%.

Although reports of fake news were highest in the Bekaa, this did not translate to an increase in tension at a community level: all three communities reported a reduction in the level of tension caused by fake news. The sharpest reduction was 11% in Qsarnaba, falling form 86% in 2021 to 77% in 2022, followed Qob Elias, falling by 9%, from 83% to 76%, and then in Chtoura, where it fell by 7% from 92% in 2021 to 86% in 2022.

Awareness of, or participation in, fact-checking campaigns decreased by 34% in Qob Elias and 56% in Qsarnaba, standing at 38% and 35% respectively in 2022. However, knowledge or participation in these fact-checking campaigns tripled in Chtoura, increasing from 7% in 2021 to 32% in 2022. Reasons for this were unclear.

Figure 103: Fake news and its impact, Bekaa Governorate

Both, Abbasiyeh and Miye-w-Miyeh drove the increase in reports of fake news in the South. In Miyeh-w-Miyeh reports of fake news increased by 58% to 46% in 2022, and by 106% to 41% in Abbasiyeh. These reports fell by 3% in Haris, to 43% in 2022.

In both, Abbasiyeh and Miyeh-w-Miyeh we also found significant increases in the reports that fake news increased community tensions. In Miyeh-w-Miyeh, we saw a doubling in this view, from 20% in 2021 to 43% in 2022. And in Abbasiyeh, the value more than tripped, from 11% in 2021 to 38% in 2022.

In all three communities, we found increased awareness / participation in fact-checking campaigns. In Miyeh-w-Miyeh, awareness / participation increased from 26% in 2021 to 48% in 2022 (up c.86%); in Haris the increase was slightly gentler—42%—from 15% in 2021 to 22% in 2022. Finally, in Abbasiyeh we saw an over 360% increase (albeit from the lower 2021 value of 6%) to 31%.

Figure 104: Fake news and its impact, South Governorate

In Qalamoun, reports of fake news decreased between 2021 and 2022, from 85% to 76%, though they increased in Chekka, from 60% to 66%. In both communities, we found a decrease in the view that fake news increased local tension. In Chekka, this perception decreased by 20%, from 55% in 2021 to 45% in 2022. In Qalamoun, it decreased by 17% but remained high at 68% in 2022. Finally, in both communities we found reductions in awareness of, or participation in online fact-checking campaigns. In Qalamoun we saw a 10% reduction from 41% in 2021 to 38% in 2022; in Chekka we saw a steeper reduction of 26% albeit from a lower baseline: from 18% to 14%.

Figure 105: Fake news and its impact, North Governorate

We found increases in reports of fake news in both, Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline. Reports increased by 13% in Jdeidet el-Chouf, to 85% in 2022, and by 7% in Baaqline, to 83%. In Jdeidet el-Chouf we found persistently high rates of those who agreed that fake news increased community tension: 95%. Although rates were lower in Baaqline: 75%, this mirrored a 33% increase in reports of fake news, up from 55% in 2021. Finally, in both communities we saw significant drops in awareness of, or participation in, fake news campaigns. In Jdeidet el-Chouf, we found an 85% drop against this measure, from 13% in 2021 to 2% in 2022. In Baaqline, we saw a 26% drop form 28% in 2021 to 21% in 2022.

Figure 56: Fake news and its impact, Mount Lebanon

Through FGDs and interviews, we found mixed views on the extent to which fake news was an issue; this seemed to vary by community. In Abbasiyeh, FGD participants agreed that fake news had increased due to the political and economic crisis, but feared that nothing could be done to reduce this, particularly as people were in the habit of sharing news without checking sources. In Chekka and Jdeidet el-Chouf participants echoed the view that staying home during the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with low social media controls and limited fact-checking meant that fake news travelled fast.

In Baaqline also, participants reported that fake news was increasing tension, and that the municipality had been subjected to fake news also; in one instance, the municipality intervened to clarify the situation and tension de-escalated. Also in Baaqline, one interviewee said that fake news had become a catalyst for conflict:

"The reason why people directly get frustrated by fake news and fights get ignited based on things said on social media, is because people are already on edge. People barely have any money and are struggling, so any word said out of place would cause a fight."

Annex 1 Demographics by Governorate

Demographics in the North

We provide an overview of the demographics and profile of both communities, below. Exact population data in Lebanon is unavailable as census results are not made public by the government.

Table 18: Political and economic profile of Chekka and Qalamoun, in the North Governorate

	Chekka	Qalamoun
Population attributes		
Education rates % literate	All respondents (Lebanese and Syrians) had at least completed elementary education. - 4.8% of Lebanese surveyed had only completed elementary education. - 58.6% of Syrians surveyed completed elementary education. -51.6% of Lebanese and nil % of Syrians reported having a university education (undergraduate and post graduate).	All surveyed Lebanese had received at least a primary school education. 2% of Syrians had no formal education. 20% of Lebanese and 5% of Syrians reported having a university-level education.
Female and male education rates	44% men and 41% women surveyed had an undergraduate or postgraduate degree.	Syrian women were slightly more likely to have no formal education than women (1% compared to nil for men). Men (17%) were more likely than women (12%) to have an undergraduate or postgraduate degree.
Male employment	A total of 51% of men described themselves as employed (30%) or self-employed (21.4%). Formal employment amongst men decreased slightly from 33% in 2020.	A total of 50% of men self-described as employed (24%) or self-employed (26%), with increases in both formal and self employment amongst men.
Female employment	A total of 31% of women described themselves as employed (17%) or self-employed (14%). Formal employment amongst women decreased by 1% year on year, and self employment increased by 9% in the same period	A total of 13% of women self-described as employed (7%) or self-employed (7%). The formal employment rate for women in Qalamoun halved year on year, and the self-employment rate increased by 6 points.
Location attributes		

Population estimate	UNDP population estimate: 8,336 Lebanese and 1,652 Syrians.[11]	UNDP population estimate: 4,823 Lebanese and 2,976 Syrians. However, the Qalamoun municipality described itself as having 13,000 residents and 4,000 Syrian refugees.[12]
Rural/Urban	Urban: coastal town connected through the high road to regional centres.	Mixed: rural and urban.
Sectarian profile	Mixed population estimated at 27% Maronites, 20% Greek Orthodox and the remaining Sunni and Shi'a.[13]	Majority Sunni Muslim; specific breakdown unknown.
Political settlement	The residents in Chekka are divided in their political affiliations between the three leading Christian parties: the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces and Marada.	The town was historically secular and loyal to Arab and Syrian nationalist political parties, though this has changed.[14] Now, the (largely Sunni) Future Movement traditionally dominates, but there is growing loyalty towards Islamist political groups, such as al-Jamaa al-Islamiya.
Local economy	Relies on private sector and industry, primarily factories such as cement, sugar refining plans, paper and cardboard manufacturing and lime and gypsum quarries. Smaller agricultural sector.	Relies on low-value handcrafts local produce (olive oil, rose essence), and fisheries. Heavy reliance on public sector employment.
Violence / Use of force (contested / uncontested space)	Unknown; our researchers reported low rates of violence between communities; a curfew is imposed on Syrians by the municipality.	Contested - There were issues around 2007-2008 with few residents from town getting involved with armed Islamic groups during clashes with the Lebanese army.
Other	Last year saw reports of the widespread use of child labour and heavy competition with refugees for industry jobs.	No serious clashes with refugees over jobs due to the town's reliance on the public sector.

Demographics in the South

We provide an overview of community profiles, below. Population estimates varied between sources and exact population data was unavailable to us.

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[11] Though another UNDP report estimated that Chekka has7,500 permanent residents and 1,200 Syrian residents, 400 foreign labourers from Egypt, Bangladesh, India, Philippines, and other countries; see UNDP Chekka Final Report.

[12] 'Qalamoun Administration', Municipality of Qalamoun; Updated on 4 June 2017: https://www.qalamoun.org/municipality/qlm-gov.html

[13] KII, Deputy Mayor, Chekka, July 2020.

[14] See Al Akhbar,«وزيرستان لبنان»؟ هل تتحوّل جامعياً أستاذاً 30 الـ بلدة القلمون Updated on 18 July 2007: https://al-akhbar.com/Archive_Local_News/189263, though this data may be contested.

Table 19: Political and economic profile of Miyeh-w-Miyeh, Haris and Abbasiyeh, in the South Governorate

	Miyeh-w-Miyeh	Haris	Abbasiyeh
Population attributes			
Education rates % literate	2% Lebanese and 8% Syrians had no formal education. 40% Lebanese, 8% Syrians and 25% Palestinians had a university education.	5% Lebanese respondents described themselves as having no formal education. 10% Lebanese no Syrians described themselves as having a university education.	2% Lebanese and 11% Syrians described themselves as having no formal education. 35% Lebanese and no Syrians described themselves as being university educated.
Female and male education rates	More men than women had no formal education (4% men compared to 1% women). 31% men and 41% women have university education.	More women than men had no formal education (7% women compared to 1% men). On the other end of the scale, more women (13%) than men (4%) had a university education.	Men were more likely to lack a formal education (4%) compared to women (2%) Women were more likely than men to be university educated (37%, compared with 24%).
Male employment	74% men described themselves as employed (42%) or self employed (33%). This compares to only 20% formal employment in 2020.	72% men described themselves as employed (14%) or self-employed (59%). This is broadly unchanged from last year	72% men described themselves as employed (42% compared with 12% in 2020) or self-employed (31% compared with 46% in 2020).
Female employment	45% women described themselves as employed (31%) or self employed (14%). Again, formal employment among women increased by 9 points on the previous year.	41% women described themselves as employed (12%) or self-employed (29%). Formal employment increased slightly (by about 1 percentage point), whereas self-employment increased more significantly.	45% of women described themselves as employed (28% compared with 16% in 2020) or self-employed (16% compared with 11% in 2020).
Location attributes			
Population estimate	UNDP estimated population: 900 permanent Lebanese,	UNDP estimated population: 8,000 permanent residents; 4,000 seasonable	UNDP estimated population: 4,5000 permanent Lebanese residents and 14,000 non-Lebanese residents including 9,000 Syrian refugees.

	24,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Syrian refugees.[15]	residents, 900 displaced Syrians and 100 others.[16]	
Urban / Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Sectarian profile	Historically Christian, but largely Sunni Muslim in profile due to the refugee demographics.	Overwhelmingly Shi'a.	Mixture of Shi'a, Sunni and Christians and about 200 Arab Bedouins. Palestinians concentrated in two core areas: Shabriha & Jall el-Bahr (many reportedly also Lebanese nationals). Most refugees reported to live in private accommodation.
Political settlement	Prominent families compete for power, and tension peaks during elections. Conflict between families compounded after the Mayor failed to resign after three years, in breach of an informal agreement between them.[17]	The two main political groups present at Haris are Amal and Hezbollah. The Mayor affiliates with Amal.	Hezbollah and Amal are the primary parties. Others, like Iraqi Ba'ath Party, the Communist Party, Syrian National Party and Palestinian parties also operate.
Local economy	Trade is practically non-existent and limited to certain metal industries. Agriculture is a source of temporary (and seasonal) employment, although the sector faces water shortages and lacks the equipment necessary to make it productive. High dependence on public-sector jobs, particularly in the military (around 15 Generals reportedly originate from the town).	Construction and agriculture are the major sources of revenue; the community also relies heavily on remittances from expats in Sub-Saharan Africa.	Broad-based economy: Carpentry, agriculture, banking, accounting, furniture-making, metallurgy, aluminium and glass-making. Many Syrians work in agriculture—which is heavily affected by water shortages—construction, trade and other industries in the city.

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[15] MSR through the Mechanisms for Stabilisation and Resilience, March 2019
[16] Project for Updating the Maps of Risks and Resources Through the MSR, March 2019
[17] Prominent families include Bizri, Francis, Abo Saba, Al Rifai, Haddad, Saleh and Wanna.

	The local agriculture sector employs around 500 foreign labourers.		
Violence / Use of force (contested / uncontested space)	Contested and overlapping political power structures include the Popular Palestinian Committee, Fatah, Hamas, Jihad, Phalanges, Lebanese Forces, and Free Patriotic Movement. Control over the camps is heavily contested. Armed organisations in the camp include Fatah, Hamas and Ansar Allah. Armed clashes occur at the camp affecting stability and security of the village.	Relatively low-violence rates; power held in balance. The most prominent families are Al Ahmad, Al Ali, Nasser, Yehia, Saad, Saleh, Khawaja, Jawad and Fakih.	Tensions occur within the municipality between said parties in a power struggle in town. do not lead to clashes or armed conflict. There is tension between communities over jobs.
Other	Tensions with Syrians reported to have reduced over the past year	Tensions with Syrians reported to have stayed the same, particularly due to a curfew for Syrians.	Tensions with Syrians reduced as 1) Lebanese militia withdrew from Syrians and 2) curfews on Syrians have been lifted. In general, reports that firearm ownership is increasing in general.

Demographics in Mount Lebanon

We provide an overview of the demographics of the area, below.

Table 8: Political and economic profile of Jdeidet el-Chouf and Baaqline, in Mount Lebanon

	Jdeidet el-Chouf	Baaqline
Population attributes		
Education rates % literate	1% Lebanese respondents described having had no formal education. 47% Lebanese were university educated.	No respondents described lacking a formal education. 49% Lebanese went to university/ postgrad education.
Female and male education rates	1% of women had no formal education. Women were more likely to be degree-educated than men (38% compared with 34%)	Women were more likely to be degree educated (49%) than men (42%).
Male employment	62% men described themselves as employed (20%) or self employed (42%). Although formal employment held constant, self-employment decreased from 51% in 2020.	Formal and self-employment increased amongst men: 39% described themselves as employed in 2021 compared to 29% in 2020;

		43% described themselves as self-employed, compared with 38% in 2020.
Female employment	34% women described themselves as employed (26%) or self-employed (24%). Although employment rates amongst women held constant, self employment more than tripped from 2020's 7%.	Formal employment decreased slightly amongst women, well self-employment increased. 25% described themselves as employed (compared to 27% in 2020) and 16% as self employed (compared to 7% in 2020).
Location attributes		
Population estimate	UNDP estimated population: 20,000 total.[18] The broader Jdeidet el-Chouf is estimated to total 69,705 residents. UNDP also estimated a Syrian population of 1,308 individuals.	12,000 permanent residents and 3,000 seasonal residents. Non-Lebanese residents number approximately 2,500 people (including 730 Syrian).[19]
Urban / Rural	Urban	Urban
Sectarian profile	Majority Druze	Majority Druze
Political settlement	The Progressive Socialist Party dominates, with a small presence of civil society supporters, Wi'am Wahab followers (an opposition Druze leader) and the Lebanese Democratic Party (led by Talal Erslen).	Various political groups operate through local Druze officials. These include the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), led by Walid Jumblatt. Divisions between the opposition and the municipality have increased and are still evident. The Mayor recently excluded supporters of the 17 October protests from municipal projects, and tried to exclude opposition from the 2019 UNDP MSR process.[20]
Local economy	A regional employer. The area had a booming real estate sector which as a large source of employment; this changed in 2017 due to the country's worsening economic conditions.	Reliant on trade, real estate and remittances. Syrian refugees work in agriculture and construction. According to the Mayor, Lebanese immigration has helped Baaqline stay resilient.
Violence / Use of force (contested /	Conflict over goods and the price of goods is increasing, particularly in the Bekaata market. Relatively uncontested: the Fatayri	Unclear. Reports that persona-political tensions decreased because of COVID.

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[18] Conflict Analysis Report, Dawaer, April 2020

[19] Project for Updating Maps of Risks and Resources through the MSR, Nov 2018

[20] According to findings in the Conflict Analysis Report, Dawaer Foundation, April 2020. In interviews with the mayor, he clarified that he is not against the revolution, but that he did not want the municipality's meetings to become a forum for debate, so he thought it was easiest to exclude pro-revolution activists.

uncontested space)	family dominates and the Mayor is always a Fatayri, as are half of the Municipal Council members. There was a reticence in the community to discuss disputes.	
Other	Cases of theft are reported to have increased. Syrian workers were already present in the village before the crisis, working in agriculture, construction and as car mechanics.[21]	Some tensions with refugees over jobs.

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[21] In 2020 we were told that the municipality prohibited Syrians from opening their own businesses; we do not know if this is still the case.

Demographics in the Bekaa

We provide an overview of community profiles, below. Population estimates varied between sources and exact population data was unavailable to us.

Table 29: Political and economic profile of Qob Elias, Chtoura and Qsarnaba, in the Bekaa Governorate

	Qob Elias	Chtoura	Qsarnaba
Population attributes			
Education rates % literate	25% of Syrians had no formal education (compared with 16% in 2020). 26% Lebanese and 2% Syrians had a university degree.	7% Syrians had formal education. 48% Lebanese and 16% Syrians had a degree.	23% Syrians lacked a formal education. 50% Lebanese had tertiary education.
Female and male education rates	27% women and 9% male respondents with no formal education. 18% of women compared with 2% of men had a university degree.	Syrian women (7%) were more likely than Syrian men (1%) to lack a formal education. Lebanese women (30%) were more likely than men (25%) to have tertiary education.	There was a small difference between Syrian men and women with no formal education (4% and 5% respectively. Lebanese women were much more likely than men to be university educated (52% and 23% respectively).
Male employment	We saw a significant reduction in formal employment in the town from 44% to 29% (5% employed, 24% self-employed).	Male employment increased from 35% in 2020 to 46% in 2021, boosted by an increase in those joining the informal sector (33% up from 25% in 2020). 13% described themselves as employed compared with 10% in 2020.	Male employment dropped significantly, from 74% in 2020 to 43% in 2021, comprising 15% formal employment and 28% self employment.
Female employment	The rate of female employment remained constant at 30%, though formal employment more than halved (from 11% in 2020 to 5% in 2021. Self employment increased from 18% to 25%).	Female employment fell from 22% in 2020 to 19% in 2021. This was driven by a fall in formal employment, from 18% in 2020 to 10% in 2021, and a doubling in self employment from 4% in 2020 to 9% in 2021.	Female employment increased comparatively—mainly driven by self employment—from 20% in 2020 to 36% in 2021. 22% described themselves as employed and 14% self employed.
Other	The Mayor has reportedly employed many of his family in the municipality and on municipal projects. Tensions with Syrians increasing due to economic	Community members from neighbouring villages and towns operate shops and businesses in Chtoura, which leaves the community largely empty when shops close.	Refugees form a core component of the labour force, particularly in agriculture and construction. Child labour is reportedly widespread

	crisis and over jobs. The communities "bear" with each other, but it unclear how long the calm will remain. Night-time theft has increased due to increasing level of poverty. Syrian-Palestinian conflict also occurs.	Some tensions exist with Syrians (including over the recent elections in Syria) and between Syrians and Palestinians.	amongst Syrians in the agriculture sector.
Population estimate	UNDP population estimate: 50,0000 Lebanese and 30,000 Syrian.[22]	UNDP population estimate: 370 permanent Lebanese residents; 2,000 seasonal Lebanese residents and 705 Syrians in100 residential units.[23]	UNDP population estimate: 8,000 permanent residents, including 200 Syrians. The number of Syrians increased to 1,800 after the conflict began. Syrians live in a mixture of camps and independent houses.[24]
Urban / Rural	Urbanised – the village of Qob Elias has grown and its outskirts are not well equipped with basic infrastructure.	Urban a transit route to Central and North Bekaa villages.	Rural
Sectarian profile	65% Sunni and 35% Christian (Christian communities including Maronite, Catholics, Orthodox, Protestant). Arab Bedouins live on the outskirts of the village.	Over 60% Maronite and Catholic. The remaining population is Shi'a, Sunni and Orthodox Christian.	Predominantly Shi'a
Political settlement	Representation in the municipality is split equally between Sunni and Christians. All political groups are active, including specifically the Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces, and the Free	Most municipal officials (six) are Christian and three are Shi'a. Political groups include the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah and Amal. The current Mayor has been in	Unknown, believed to be controlled by Hezbollah.

[22] MSR Input to the Perception Survey – All Regions.

[23] UNDP, MSR, March 2019; The Project for Updating the Maps of Resources and Risks. Syrians in Chekka are believed to from a higher socio-economic stratum. Note, 235 Chekka Lebanese voted in the 2017 municipal elections.

[24] Project for Updating the Maps of Resources and Risks Through the MSR, Dec 2018

	Patriotic Movement. The Sabaa party has also gained momentum.	that position for the last four terms (22 years).	
Local economy	Relies on agriculture for around 80% its revenues. Industrial sector is also active, with factories working in agri-food, wine and arak-making, plastics, cardboard, packaging and products complementing agriculture. Syrians tend to work as labourers in agriculture.	Chtoura is the commercial and trading centre of the Bekaa with many restaurants, banks, stores, hotels, wineries, exchange stores and a dairy factory. Chtoura relies on the agricultural economy in the Bekaa but less trade has been passing through Chtoura due to the currency devaluation and crisis.	Reliant on agriculture and food factories for local employment. Agriculture is plagued by poor irrigation, high water costs and poor equipment and machinery. Respondents reported that only one or two businesses continue to provide employment opportunities.
Violence / Use of force (contested / uncontested space)	Family violence is common and sectarian violence increases during elections. Violence between tribes breaks out, particularly over the right to move produce (vegetables) through markets and over rents. Violent conflict is sometimes reported between villagers and the Arabs / Bedouins.[25] High rates of weapons proliferation. An increase in robbery.[26]	Shi'a families have more political ties than the rest as they are more actively engaged with Shi'a political parties. Biggest families are Sawma, Chames, Assi and Kassouf.	No tensions with Syrian refugees, but social and financial tensions in general are growing. One interviewee described a shift in the social dynamic of the town, from political clientelism to family tribalism, suggesting that the political networks are fragmenting and ceding ground to increased reliance on tribal and family networks.

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[25] The largest Muslim families are Al Moallem, Hatoum, Hayek, Merhi, Kazaoun, Harati; the largest Christian families are Badr, Choueiry, Chantiri, Sayyah, Sabat and Lebbos.

[26] Reported by a former MSS committee member interviewed by our team. The individual added that the lack of street lighting in the expanded parts of the town has increased instability and incidents of theft.

Annex X Interview List

Community	Participants' profiles
Chekka	Vice Mayor Two municipal members
Qalamoun	Deputy Mayor Head of Medical Association Head of Sports Club Environmental Activist
Jdeidet el Chouf	Mayor Member of municipality Local actor Trader
Baaqline	Mayor Activist Member of scout organization Member of women cooperative Teacher
Haris	Deputy Mayor Mokhtar Engineer Member of women cooperative
Abbasiyeh	Mayor Municipality's engineer Student/activist Former MSS committee member
Miyeh-w-Miyeh	Mayor Deputy Mayor High school teacher Activist Member of Palestinian Popular Committee
Qob Elias	Mayor Municipal member Head of municipal police Former MSS committee member Two activists
Qsarnaba	Mayor Former Mayor Member of agricultural coop Employee at the ministry of social affairs
Chtoura	Two members of municipality Municipality clerk Member of Arcenciel organization/ activist

Focus group discussions

Community	Participants' profiles
Chekka	Development practitioner and activist
	Three University professors
	High School Director
	Activist
Qalamoun	Five university professors
	Engineer
Jdeidet el Chouf	Member of women cooperative
	Two activists
	Psychologist
Baaqline	Local actor
	Trader
	School director
	National library member
	Local actor
	Baaqline environmental association member
Haris	University student
	Municipal member
	Cooperative president
	Local resident
Abbasiyeh	Agricultural cooperative member
	High school director
	Teacher
	Social worker
	Teacher and social worker
Miyeh-w-Miyeh	School director
	Social Club President
	Two activists
	Scout leader
	School teacher
Qob Elias	Five activists
Qsarnaba	Mokhtar
	Two activists
Chtoura	Local doctor
	Activist/ trader

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Agulhas

For more information about this document or general enquires about Agulhas or our work, please contact us at:

Address: 10e Branch Place, London N1 5PH

Telephone: +44 333 700 0770

Email: contact@agulhas.co.uk

Twitter: @Agulhas_

Web: www.agulhas.co.uk